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Examining the political and social consequences of coercive border enforcement, 
this thesis hypothesizes that unilateral border hardening erodes institutional legitimacy 
and undermines regional stability. Relying on a case study of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan 
border in Central Asia’s Ferghana Valley, the thesis finds that border hardening is likely 
to change local perceptions of the border, diminish its overall institutional legitimacy, and 
weaken regional stability. Border institutions depend on a mixture of willing obedience 
and coercion by the state to obtain social compliance. Coercive and illegitimate means of 
border enforcement may have unintended consequences, undermining perceptions of 
legitimacy and leading to a logic of escalation of border hardening measures. This may in 
turn necessitate increasing levels of coercive border enforcement in order to achieve 
social compliance. Perceptions of border legitimacy influence the extent to which 
individuals voluntarily comply with border rules. Methods of border hardening are nearly 
always regarded as illegitimate and coercive when they adversely affect the local 
population. Policy-makers and military leaders must move beyond simple assumptions 
about borders as barriers in order to balance short- and long-term factors of security, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION  
Do hardened borders enhance or undermine regional stability? While economic or 
security concerns may drive unilateral hardening of borders, little is known about the long-
term impact of this policy in light of popular support and local perceptions of the border. 
An underlying theme of this thesis is the role of unintended consequences on the legitimacy 
of the border institution. The opening question considers whether the policy of hardening—
while intended to improve security—undermines regional stability by weakening the 
institutional legitimacy of the border. Under specific circumstances and in a particular 
historical context, the hardening of a border may drive local perceptions of illegitimacy 
because it contradicts local expectations for the meaning and purpose of the political 
border. The border is not only perceived as illegitimate but also complicates the everyday 
life of borderland people. This perception of illegitimacy—which is often associated with 
feelings or beliefs that include annoyance, unfairness, suspicion, corruption, and fear—may 
also shape local behavior and influence whether people willingly obey the border rules or 
comply merely owing to the state’s coercive use of force.  
The relationship between border hardening and the weakening of institutional 
legitimacy is especially evident in the Ferghana Valley, where borders have historically 
been open and porous. This thesis considers border hardening and local perceptions in 
relation to institutional legitimacy, which is an element of regional stability. Beyond the 
historical circumstances of border making in the Ferghana Valley is the contemporary 
global debate on the meaning and legitimacy of borders to provide national security and 
enhance regional stability. These issues are geopolitical in nature, while drawing insights 
from other disciplines, including sociology, political science, behavioral science, and 
history. Ultimately, this thesis proposes a new theory and research agenda—albeit 
narrowly focused on a specific time and place—for understanding border hardening in 
light of the institutional legitimacy of the border and regional stability. 
 2
While states have long debated the function of their borders, security fears since 
the 1990s—especially since the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 
2001—have resulted in increased border hardening, a deliberate policy response intended 
to counter international security threats and thereby enhance stability. The term “border 
hardening” refers to state efforts to demarcate and enforce a territorial border. Border 
hardening is a border making process, whereby a border becomes more difficult to 
penetrate socially, politically, or economically. Hardening restricts the movement of 
people and materials across a border through physical materialization (e.g., fences, walls, 
and limited gates) or coercive enforcement (as with armed patrols, criminalization of 
illegal border crossing, restrictive checkpoints, and visa programs). While hardening 
policies vary across time and place, this process has been directed more recently at 
countering non-traditional security threats, such as terrorism, that threaten regional 
stability.  
As a concept, the political, social, economic, and cultural dynamics of a region 
affect stability both internally and among states. “Defined as the orderly and peaceful 
operation of the balance-of-power system,” according to American political theorist G. 
John Ikenberry, stability “requires the ability of states to recognize and respond to 
shifting power distributions.”1 Consistent with most rationalist, realist, and pragmatist 
approaches to international politics, the pursuit of stability involves the balance of 
legitimacy with security and prosperity.2 Without denying the importance of economic 
and military stability, the focus of this thesis is decidedly on elements of political and 
social stability. Border hardening is usually aimed at immediate security concerns, and 
policy-makers and scholars lack consensus on whether it is constructive for future 
prosperity and stability. As a result of its complex borders as well as its geopolitical 
importance to Russia, China, the United States, and the European Union, Central Asia’s 
Ferghana Valley is a particularly useful case for examining the connection between 
border hardening and regional stability.  
                                                 
1 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After 
Major Wars (Princeton: University Press, 2001), 46. 
2 Ibid. 
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Border scholars and pundits have often thrown up their hands at the complex and 
squiggly lines representing state borders in the Ferghana Valley, retreating sometimes in 
their explanations to Stalin’s divide and rule policies or to their impression that someone 
was drawing lines on a map while drunk.3 Moreover, security experts have assumed that 
the irregular and porous borders shown in Figure 1 would promote regional instability. 
 
The complicated international border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan includes 
numerous enclaves and border posts. The Ferghana Valley is outlined in green. 
Figure 1.  Map of the Ferghana Valley.4 
                                                 
3 For examples of different characterizations of the Ferghana Valley as historically laden with 
problems, see Edward Storurton, “Kyrgyzstan: Stalin’s Deadly Legacy,” Guardian, 20 June 2010, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jun/20/kyrgyzstan-stalins-deadly-legacy; “Stalin’s 
Harvest,” Economist, 17 June 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16377083?story_id=16377083; 
“Enclaves in Central Asia: The Post-imperial Chessboard” (Banyan blog), 2 April 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/04/enclaves-central-asia; and Farkhod Tolipov, “Ad-hoc 
peace or ad-hoc war: micro-geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus,” CACI, 2 June 2016, 
https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13367-ad-hoc-peace-or-ad-hoc-war-
micro-geopolitics-of-central-asia-and-the-caucasus.html. 
4 Adapted from Nick Megoran, “On Researching ‘Ethnic Conflict’: Epistemology, Politics, and a 
Central Asian Boundary Dispute,” Europe-Asia Studies 59, no. 2 (2007): 254, http://www.jstor.org/stable/
20451348; green outline added for further definition. 
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Despite popular descriptions as “a hotbed of destabilization,”5 “a tinderbox for 
violence,”6 “a knot of difficult problems,”7 and “a Pandora’s Box of border disputes,”8 
the Ferghana Valley has witnessed twenty-five years of relative stability since the fall of 
the Soviet Union in 1991.9 During most of the Soviet era and immediately following 
independence, international borders in the Ferghana Valley were relatively porous and 
open. Border hardening increased in 1999 following terrorist attacks in the Uzbek capital 
of Tashkent, and it was amplified further in 2000 with Uzbekistan’s unilateral building of 
a fence along its border with Kyrgyzstan.  
This thesis seeks insight into the effect of border hardening on regional stability. 
Unilateral hardening of the international border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
interjected a new dynamic in the region’s previously open and porous borders.10 
Consequently, localized conflict and tensions have increased along the Uzbekistan–
Kyrgyzstan border since independence, but especially since 2000. Adapting concepts of 
legitimacy from multiple disciplines that were originally developed to explain legitimacy 
and authority for political institutions, this thesis examines the border between 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan since independence in 1991, through a period of border 
                                                 
5 Igor Rotar, “Will the Ferghana Valley Become a Hotbed of Destabilization in Central Asia?,” 
Eurasia Daily Monitor 9 (180): Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC, 3 October 2012, 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39924&cHash=
768b895149248bff881e96958af06c6d#.V9HsN00whpg. 
6 Charles Recknagel, “Ferghana Valley: A Tinderbox For Violence,” Radio Free Europe, 17 June 
2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/Why_Is_The_Ferghana_Valley_A_Tinderbox_For_Violence/
2074849.html; “Factbox: Ethnic Tinderbox of South Kyrgyzstan,” Reuters, 14 May 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-kyrgyzstan-unrest-south-idUSTRE64D47H20100514. 
7 David Trilling, “Border Violence Broadens Tension in Ferghana,” EurasiaNet, 31 October 2010, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62271. 
8 International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential,” ICG Asia Report 
no. 33, 4 April 2002, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
031F4E484F8E6EEFC1256B950040E33F-icg-casia-04apr.pdf. 
9 This statement about the relative stability in the Ferghana Valley does not imply that there is positive 
peace but rather that, despite underlying structural and performance-based problems, the region has yet to 
erupt in cross-border war. 
10 Nick Megoran, “The Critical Geopolitics of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Boundary 
Dispute, 1999–2000,” Political Geography 23, no. 6 (2004): 623. 
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hardening that began in 1999, until 2009.11 The primary research question is: How has 
border hardening between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan from 1991 to 2009 affected the 
institutional legitimacy of the border? Specifically, the focus of the analysis is on how 
border hardening changes local perceptions of the border, including local perceptions of 
legitimacy and authority, and therefore improved or undermined prospects for regional 
stability.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis investigates an ongoing debate of great importance for international 
politics: the security and stability consequences of border hardening. It does so by 
assessing border hardening and the prospects for stability in the Ferghana Valley. It also 
discusses basic assumptions related to regional stability, security, and border hardening. 
Scholars and analysts generally agree that stability depends on multiple factors related to 
sources of conflict as well as cooperation in the region. Many scholars assume also that 
border hardening supports regional stability when used to counter non-traditional security 
threats such as terrorism. Framing a border as an institution, this thesis analyzes the 
subjective forms of border legitimacy and obedience in relation to local perceptions and 
social behavior. While scholarly research often focuses on the short-term performance 
                                                 
11 The analysis and information cutoff date of 2009 was selected not only to sharpen the historical 
focus on the years prior to the beginning of border hardening (1999-2000) and the short decade following 
border hardening was accepted practice, but because of two violent conflicts in Osh, Kyrgyzstan: the first 
in 1990 and the second in 2010. These events mark two of the most violent conflicts that occurred along the 
border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in the span of two decades and share remarkable similarities in 
their underlying causes. While this thesis does not investigate the causes of either of these two events 
directly, it seeks insight into the border dynamics between these two events and the potential that border 
hardening further changed the role of political institutions in the Ferghana Valley. The first event in 1990 
preceded the collapse of the Soviet Union and national independence for the three nations in the Ferghana 
Valley; the second event in 2010 followed local and national crises in the Kyrgyzstan government; the 
underlying spark for both events, according to several acclaimed specialists in the region, was political 
instability. For greater explanation of these two events, which is beyond the scope of this thesis, see Nick 
Megoran, Elmira Satybaldieva, David Lewis, and John Heathershaw, “Evaluating Peacebuilding 
Interventions in Southern Kyrgyzstan,” SIPRI–OSF, Open Society Foundations, Policy Brief, June 2014, 
https://www.staff.ncl.ac.uk/nick.megoran/pdf/policy%20brief%20sipri.pdf. 
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and effectiveness of border hardening,12 few analysts have considered how the means of 
state enforcement affect the subjective foundations of the border’s authority and 
legitimacy.  
While borders are a dominant feature of everyday life in the Ferghana Valley, the 
disagreements concern how borders contribute to security and affect prospects for 
regional stability. Border making is easily understood as a political process, but unilateral 
state enforcement of borders through hardening also has economic and social effects that 
sometimes appear to be in tension with immediate security concerns. These political, 
economic, and social effects of border hardening are related to the perceptions of 
legitimacy of the border and the willingness of people in the borderland to observe the 
border.  
Policy-makers and military leaders may also benefit from a greater appreciation 
of border dynamics, the processes of border hardening, and specific aspects of the 
Ferghana Valley. At the heart of Central Asia, the Ferghana Valley is strategically 
important to Russia, China, Turkey, the European Union, and the United States; each is 
interested in the region for its own political, economic, and security reasons. While 
borders regularly serve security functions for the state, including in military operations, 
this narrow focus limits appreciation for how border policies affect issues of legitimacy 
and respect for the border as an institution. Policy-makers and military leaders must also 
ask when, how, and to what extent border hardening is effective—either alone or in 
coordination with other security methods—in safeguarding against security threats. While 
policy and military doctrine focus on the short-term goals of securing or regulating the 
border, this thesis examines the political, economic, and social consequences of border 
hardening in relation to institutional legitimacy and regional stability. Furthermore, this 
                                                 
12 For analysis of reasons for building walls and barriers, see David B. Carter and Paul Poast, “Why 
Do States Build Walls? Political Economy, Security, and Border Stability,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
61, no. 2 (2017): 239–70, doi:10.1177/0022002715596776. For analysis on border hardening and security 
performance, see Elisabeth Vallet, Borders, Fences and Walls: State of Insecurity? (New York: Routledge, 
2016); Sylvia Longmire, Border Insecurity: Why Big Money, Fences, and Drones Aren’t Making Us Safer 
(New York City: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico 
Divide, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); Pauletta Otis and Joseph C. Bebel, “Borders 
and Boundaries: Drawing Lines Which Keep the Peace,” International Peacekeeping 6, no. 3 (1999): 31–
53, doi: 10.1080/13533319908413784. 
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thesis contributes to a growing body of interdisciplinary literature in security studies, 
geopolitics, the social sciences, and the humanities that considers prospects for regional 
stability in relation to borders, institutions, social behavior, and security policies. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS 
While satisfactory answers to complicated questions must look beyond simple 
explanations, short-term gains in state security must also be weighed against the long-
term costs for a region’s overall stability. The impact of border hardening between 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan on regional stability in the Ferghana Valley is complicated. 
Increased border hardening—an instrumental means of coercive enforcement by the 
state—may weaken the legitimacy of the border, resulting in decreased subjective respect 
for the border. The relationship of border hardening, institutional legitimacy, social 
behavior, and regional stability probably depends to a significant extent on state 
enforcement of borders primarily through instrumental coercion. With border hardening, 
the subjective willingness to obey the border decreases, the institutional legitimacy of the 
border weakens, and regional stability is threatened. The broader assessment of this thesis 
is that border hardening may undermine regional stability in certain contexts. Suggesting 
a new theoretical framework for understanding border hardening with concepts of 
institutional legitimacy, this thesis also suggests a research agenda to guide future 
multidisciplinary studies on political and social borders. 
1. Border Hardening and Regional Stability. 
This study hypothesizes that border hardening between Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan has weakened the institutional legitimacy of the border by changing social 
perceptions and diminishing willing obedience of the border’s authority, thereby 
undermining regional stability in the Ferghana Valley. This proposed theory involves 
identifying the long-term (and unintended) consequences of border hardening that extend 
beyond the immediate performance and effectiveness of hardened borders. The 
consequences involve the theoretical and practical dynamics of borders, as well as 
elements of social obedience in relation to authority and institutional legitimacy. Key 
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factors in how a border contributes to long-term regional stability include the nature of 
border enforcement and the local perceptions of the border.  
Such reasoning does not deny that border hardening may have led to improved 
regional security in the short term for the Ferghana Valley. In fact, border hardening 
between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan may have actually improved regional security in the 
Ferghana Valley by reducing cross-border illegal activity, “fixing” an ambiguous and 
porous border, and increasing state security against non-traditional threats common to the 
region such as terrorism. This assessment is consistent with a global border norm 
promoting delineated and demarcated borders, as well as with the logic that walls and 
fences help to keep out people that are regarded as dangerous.  
According to an initial assessment of the literature, a multitude of factors 
influence security in the Ferghana Valley, including local borderland dynamics, national 
border policies, and social and political resiliency, as well as the prevalence of non-
traditional security threats. Various programs intended to decrease conflict and improve 
security—on the local, national, and international level—assess the factors of instability 
in relation to the effectiveness of border policies and practices. Despite the 
aforementioned reasoning, there is some disagreement on whether border hardening 
reduces cross-border illegal activity and increases state security against non-traditional 
threats.13 While some border enforcement efforts produce immediate successes, 
assessments of long-term payoffs are even more mixed than judgments about the short-
term benefits of border hardening. Some evidence from other borderlands suggests that 
border hardening may adversely affect the political, economic, and social life of a region, 
especially when administered unilaterally along a border. The following section presents 
several basic assumptions regarding border institutions, legitimacy, and regional stability.  
                                                 
13 For a critical perspective on security and everyday life in hardened borderlands, see Alena Pfoser, 
“Between Security and Mobility: Negotiating a Hardening Border Regime in the Russian-Estonian 
Borderland,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41, no. 10 (2015): 1684–1702, doi: 10.1080/
1369183X.2015.1015408; also, Aija Lulle, “Revitalizing Borders: Memory, Mobility and Materiality in a 
Latvian-Russian Border Region,” Culture Unbound: Journal of Current Cultural Research 8, no. 1 (2016): 
43–61, doi: 10.3384/cu.2000.1525.168143. 
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2. Basic Assumptions for Legitimacy and Regional Stability Border 
Analysis 
Prior to exploring the reasoning behind the proposed theory, this section 
establishes several basic assumptions and introduces the framework for authority and 
institutional legitimacy. First, a territorial border is an institution formed through political 
and social processes rather than arising from purely organic circumstances, such as 
geographic or environmental factors. A border is not merely accepted or immediately 
dominant in the political or social landscape; this means that local, national, and regional 
agents do not respect or acknowledge a border simply because the border is there on a 
cartographer’s map. As with other institutions, borders have rules enforced by the state. 
Agents—including individuals at the local, state, or regional levels—either honor or 
disregard a border. Additionally, every state intends to gain either willing obedience or 
social compliance with the rules of the border. In its purest form, subjective obedience 
implies an individual’s willingness to accept the rightful authority of the border 
institution, whereas the mere compliance of an individual is possible even with forms of 
illegitimate state coercion.  
This thesis distinguishes between legitimate forms of institutional authority and 
illegitimate means of obtaining compliance. Functionally, a border manages or restricts 
the flow of people and goods either through legitimate institutional authority or 
illegitimate coercion. Instrumental methods of border enforcement may be legal, but 
perceived as illegitimate and normatively unjust. When an institution is legitimate, 
subjective obedience to the border is rooted in a combination of charismatic, traditional, 
and rational-legal authority in accordance with Max Weber’s framework for political and 
social behavior. Illegitimate means of enforcement demand compliance with the border 
either through forms of state coercion or interest.14  
                                                 
14 On coercion or interest, also referred to as material payoff, see Stephen E. Hanson, Post-Imperial 
Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet 
Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), specifically in Chapter 1, “Weberian 
Methodological Individualism,” 19; for a discussion on institutional authority in terms of coercion, interest, 
and belief in legitimacy, see Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of 
International Security, 5th printing (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 50. 
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Legitimate authority—and, to a lesser extent, illegitimate instrumental forms of 
enforcement—do not conclusively lead to willing obedience or compliance with the 
border; rather, there is an increase in the probability that the population will observe the 
border.15 Criminal or otherwise nefarious elements will attempt to circumvent a border, 
ignoring institutional rules, regardless of the means of enforcement or social perceptions 
of the border’s authority. The difference in the border’s institutional legitimacy—whether 
or not a state is almost entirely dependent on illegitimate coercive means of 
enforcement—is an important factor in social behavior related to the long-term stability 
of a functioning border. Individuals are more likely to respect and obey the rules of a 
border when the population subjectively perceives the border as established by a 
legitimate authority—that is, right and just according to a combination of the three 
Weberian “ideal types” of authority.16 If a border is perceived as illegitimate—illegal, 
unjustified, or not right—then the state must resort to enforcement through coercion or 
interest.17 A border merely enforced and lacking the social perception of legitimacy is 
more institutionally fragile than one perceived as legitimate.  
In some cases, compliance with the border depends on whether the state 
adequately coerces the population through force or other material instruments (i.e., border 
hardening). As soon as the state loses its will or ability to coerce the population, 
compliance with the border decreases and the legitimacy of the institution falters. 
Therefore, a border perceived as legitimate by individuals in the local borderland and 
society at large is more likely to be acknowledged and obeyed in the long-term. 
Furthermore, borders legitimized through traditional and rational-legal forms of authority 
are likely to be more institutionally stable and enduring than borders based on 
charismatic appeals or borders enforced by purely illegitimate coercive methods of 
enforcement. In other words, different perceptions of border legitimacy in the 
borderlands between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan affect social acknowledgement of the 
border: whether individuals are more likely to obey, comply, ignore, or defy. Traditional 
                                                 
15 Hanson, Post-Imperial Democracies, 19. 
16 Hanson, “Russia, Ukraine, and the Borders of Europe,” 2. 
17 Hanson, Post-Imperial Democracies, 19. 
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and rational-legal forms of authority gain more willing obedience, while coercion and 
corrupt forms of interest (e.g., illegal material incentives) garner only compliance and are 
more likely to be ignored, challenged, or overturned in the future. 
Border hardening between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan has restricted the flow of 
people and goods in the Ferghana Valley, in some locations dramatically, thus affecting 
everyday life in the borderlands. Evidence is scarce, however, on how perceptions of 
border legitimacy affect security and regional stability. As the border is enforced through 
instrumental means of coercion—including hardening, securitization, and 
militarization—those living in the borderlands may increasingly perceive the 
Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border as illegitimate. As the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border 
loses local and regional perceptions of legitimacy, increasingly coercive means of 
enforcement may be required to influence social behavior and obtain compliance with 
border rules. The use of border hardening to counter extrinsic threats, such as terrorism 
and drug smuggling, may therefore ultimately threaten regional stability when state 
enforcement creates hardships on people in their everyday lives and erodes the 
institutional legitimacy of the border. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN  
Elaborating on existing border studies, geopolitical analysis, and sociology 
theories, this thesis analyzes how borders are related to questions of stability. More 
specifically, it asks how border hardening between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan has 
affected institutional and regional stability in the Ferghana Valley through the process of 
increased or decreased legitimation of the border. Applying a sociological framework 
based on institutional legitimacy to the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border, this thesis seeks 
to better explain the prospects for institutional stability resulting from unilateral border 
hardening in light of security concerns. This thesis reviews the literature related to 
borders, border hardening, and regional stability; describes the security concerns and 
processes of border hardening in the Ferghana Valley; and provides insight into longer 
term effects of border hardening on stability. 
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This thesis uses a basic correlational analytic framework to investigate the effects 
of border hardening on regional stability since Uzbekistan’s independence from the 
Soviet Union in 1991. Correlational analysis implies not only that causality is 
“ambiguous” in the strictest sense of social science methodology,18 but also–as historian 
John Lewis Gaddis has argued—that variables are neither independent nor dependent but 
always interconnected and interdependent when dealing with human affairs.19 Applying a 
theory of legitimacy to a specific case-study of the Ferghana Valley, this thesis attempts 
to take stock of the current scholarly approaches that address border hardening, social 
behavior, and stability, as well as to provide insight for political and military leaders 
about how stability is based on “contingent, not categorical, causation.”20  
This thesis seeks a more holistic approach than a simple cause-and-effect analysis. 
Drawing on historical and sociological methods, this thesis demonstrates that stability is 
not simply a matter of specific factors of conflict, but that “everything is linked to 
everything else” within a system.21 In other words, “everything is interdependent.”22 
Structure, processes, and organization are at least as relevant as a combination of 
traditionally discussed factors of conflict. The other aspect of this more historically 
inclined approach is the “preference for parsimony in consequences, but not causes.”23 
Specifically, there are multiple causes not only for the border hardening but also for 
instability in the Ferghana Valley. The significance of border hardening, however, is 
determined by its subsequent consequences that affect regional stability, as well as by its 
prominence in contemporary policy debates regarding security.  
                                                 
18 See Harry T. Reis, Handbook of Research Methods in Social and Personality Psychology, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 680, and broadly, Blair T. Johnson and Alice H. Eagly, 
Chapter 26, “Meta-analysis of Research in Social and Personality Psychology.” 
19 John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 91–109. 
20 Ibid., 64. 
21 See Albert-László Barabási, Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What It 
Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life (New York: Plume, 2003), 7. 
22 Gaddis, Landscape of History, 148. The difference between political scientists and historians in 
terms of variables and levels of complexity is elaborated by the term “endogeneity” in Colin Elman and 
Miriam Fendius Elman, Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of 
International Relations, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 56. 
23 Gaddis, Landscape of History, 105–106. 
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Since the purpose of this analysis is explanatory, the method depends on a 
“particular generalization” of theory applied to a specific case study rather than a 
“general particularization” of a case study to demonstrate a theory.24 Building on 
multiple arguments and assumptions from border theory, this thesis adapts Stephen 
Hanson’s neo-Weberian framework of authority and institutional legitimacy and applies 
it to border hardening. This combination of theoretical presumptions and explanations of 
the historical border hardening process in the Ferghana Valley provides insight to the 
relationship between border hardening, perceptions of institutional legitimacy, and long-
term prospects for stability.  
While Weber saw “the central dilemma of politics” as “turning raw power into 
legitimate authority,”25 this thesis reverses the process by looking at an example of 
legitimate authority undermined through the use of raw state power at the border. A state 
has the traditional and rational-legal authority to harden its border; but when hardening is 
undertaken unilaterally, principally through means of coercion, the border’s legitimacy 
may be eroded and weakened. Hardening along the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border is a 
process, while the subjective perception of legitimacy is the mediator; and the relative 
degree of stability in the Ferghana Valley is the consequence.26  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE  
Chapter II reviews border literature, including a survey of existing explanations 
for instability in the Ferghana Valley and overall border theory. Chapter III considers 
borders as an institution, the legitimacy of borders, and border hardening. Chapter IV 
provides a concise historical account of Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border hardening from 
1991 until 2009, contextualized by the Western “danger narrative” and regional security 
concerns in the Ferghana Valley, and assesses local perceptions of the border in response 
to hardening. Chapter V proposes a legitimacy framework for the Uzbekistan–
                                                 
24 See Gaddis, Landscape of History, for general discussion between social science and historical 
methods, specifically 106 for quoted text. 
25 Ikenberry, After Victory, 17. 
26 For an explanation of mediator variables, see Reis, Handbook of Research Methods in Social and 
Personality Psychology, 519, 522. 
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Kyrgyzstan border, and synthesizes the impact of border hardening on the long-term 
prospects for regional stability in the Ferghana Valley. Chapter VI concludes with 
recommendations for future research on border hardening and institutional legitimacy. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
What does the literature say about the Ferghana Valley, its security concerns, and 
more generally, related concepts within border studies, such as border hardening? This 
chapter surveys the literature on two primary subjects: first, existing analyses of the 
Ferghana Valley, including conventional explanations of its security concerns; second, 
relevant concepts from border theory, including definitions and core concepts. 
Scholarship on the stability of the Ferghana Valley ranges from alarmist literature to 
more nuanced and informed. This thesis critically investigates the conventional wisdom 
that border hardening addresses security concerns and improves regional stability. 
A. THE FERGHANA VALLEY: A SHORT BACKGROUND 
Besides its beauty and abundant natural endowments, nothing about the 
Ferghana Valley is simple. 
 —S. Frederick Starr27 
The geographic context of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border is the backdrop to 
many of the more immediate events related to border hardening and stability in the 
Ferghana Valley. Located in the heart of Central Asia and “surrounded by mountains on 
all sides,”28 the Ferghana Valley is one of the most agriculturally fruitful and densely 
populated areas of Eurasia,29 where the Naryn and Kara Rivers meet to form the great 
Syr Darya River. The entangled and disputed borders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan within the Ferghana Valley—described by Sally Cummings as “awkward, 
either porous or potentially irredentist”—mark this post-Soviet territory. The length of 
more than 1,099 kilometers30 does not begin to accurately illustrate the Uzbekistan–
                                                 
27 S. Frederick Starr, introduction to Ferghana Valley: The Heart of Central Asia, edited by S. 
Frederick Starr, Baktybek Beshimov, Inomjon I. Bobokulov, and P. D Shozimov (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2011), ix. 
28 Abdukakhor Saidov, “The Ferghana Valley: The Pre-Colonial Legacy,” in Ferghana Valley, 3. 
29 Starr, introduction to Ferghana Valley, i. 
30 Yessai Nikoyan, “Uzbekistan: Logistics Capacity Assessment,” World Food Program, October 
2006, 3, http://www.logcluster.org/sites/default/files/documents/wfp-lca-uzbekistan. 
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Kyrgyzstan border’s overall complexity. The borderlands of the Ferghana Valley are 
more like a tangle of yarn or a “chessboard” than a simple line.31  
Figure 2 depicts where ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks live throughout the Ferghana 
Valley, sometimes in enclave communities and as minorities in neighboring states 
detached from their ethnic homelands.32 Ethnic Uzbeks are a significantly large minority 
in the urban populations of Jalalabad and Osh in Kyrgyzstan as well as the Uzbekistan 
enclave of Sokh, which is surrounded by Kyrgyz territory as shown in Figure 2. Ethnic 
Uzbeks are a majority in the Uzbekistan enclave of Shakhimardan, which is also 
surrounded by Kyrgyz territory.33 Enclave residents have limited mobility because of 
border hardening measures—such as fences, checkpoints, and closures, as well as road 
restrictions—that frustrate travel among the enclaves, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan.34 
                                                 
31 Central Asia was notably described as a chessboard under a different context by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski in “A Geostrategy for Eurasia,” Foreign Affairs, 1 October 1997, 50–64, accessed 1 September 
2016, http://infoweb.newsbank.com/resources/doc/nb/news/10FD87847697D098?p=AWNB. For 
references to the contemporary entangled borders of the Ferghana Valley, see Madeleine Reeves, “Fixing 
the Border: On the Affective Life of the State in Southern Kyrgyzstan,” Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space 29, no. 5 (2011): 911–912, doi: 10.1068/d18610; Madeleine Reeves, “Materialising 
State Space: ‘Creeping Migration’ and Territorial Integrity in Southern Kyrgyzstan,” Europe-Asia Studies 
61, no. 7 (2009): 1288, doi: 10.1080/09668130903068814; D. T. Ak-Sai, “Enclaves in Central Asia: The 
Post-imperial Chessboard,” The Economist, 1 April 2014, http://www.economist.com/node/21599963. 
32 Cummings, Understanding Central Asia, 41. 
33 See Rashid Gabdulhakov, “Geographical Enclaves of the Fergana Valley: Do Good Fences Make 
Good Neighbors?,” Central Asia Security Policy Briefs no. 14, OSCE Academy in Bishkek, http://osce-
academy.net/upload/Policy_briefs/Policy_Brief_14.pdf. 
34 See Shirin Akiner, Kyrgyzstan 2010: Conflict and Context, Silk Road Paper, July 2016, Central 
Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS (Washington, 
DC), 100; Khamidov, Alisher, “Fergana Valley: Stringent Border Measures Fuelling Tension in Enclaves,” 
EurasiaNet, 12 August 2009, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav081309.shtml. 
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Map of ethnicities in Kyrgyzstan shows distribution of Kyrgyz, Uzbek majorities, Uzbek 
minorities, and “other” nationalities. Kyrgyzstan is depicted as green; both Sokh and 
Shakhimardan enclaves are identified. 
Figure 2.  Ethnicity Map of the Ferghana Valley.35  
Elsewhere, and especially in borderlands of the Ferghana Valley, distinctions 
between ethnicities are sometimes blurred through inter-marriages in lengthy family 
histories.36 While Uzbekistan controls the majority of the grazing and farming land, 
water and power lie in Kyrgyzstan territory.37 Multiple social, economic, and political 
                                                 
35 Adapted from Andrew R. Bond and Natalie R. Koch, “Interethnic Tensions in Kyrgyzstan: A 
Political Geographic Perspective,” Eurasian Geography and Economics, 51, no. 4 (2010), 543, doi: 
10.2747/1539-7216.51.4.531; additional map locations labeled with information from Necati Polat, 
Boundary Issues in Central Asia (Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 2002), 50. 
36 On the communal aspect of marriages, see Aksana Ismailbekova, “Coping Strategies: Public 
Avoidance, Migration, and Marriage in the Aftermath of the Osh Conflict, Fergana Valley,” Nationalities 
Papers 41, no. 1 (2013): 109–127, doi: 10.1080/00905992.2012.748736. On the inter-ethnic aspect of 
marriage in the Ferghana Valley, see Jeff Sahadeo and Russell Zanca, Everyday Life in Central Asia: Past 
and Present (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 31, 41, 174; Starr, Ferghana Valley, 172. 
37 See Christine Bichsel, Kholnazar Mukhabbatov, and Lenzi Sherfedinov, “Land, Water, and 
Ecology,” in Ferghana Valley, edited by Starr, 255. 
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challenges face this region, including terrorism, transnational criminal organizations and 
smuggling, natural and man-made environmental risks, disputes over borders and land 
use rights, and poorly constructed roads and infrastructure.38 The major urban areas 
outside of Uzbekistan with large Uzbek populations—Osh and Jalalabad in Kyrgyzstan—
were also the sites of violent ethnic clashes in 2010. Characterizations of the region as 
burdened by its borders in “danger narratives” frequently drive outside speculation 
related to regional stability. These international misperceptions, as discussed on Chapter 
IV, influence international policy and foreign aid as well as security assistance funding.  
The Ferghana Valley is a region with remarkable continuities and discontinuities. 
For much of its history, the Ferghana Valley has been continually unified under one 
political ruler,39 whether indigenous or an outside invading force. “The Persians, Turks, 
Greeks, Arabs, Chinese, and Russians have all encroached on and transformed this 
region,” observes Sally Cummings.40 Babur was born in the Ferghana Valley and rose to 
become the first Mughal emperor; during the sixteenth century, he commented on the 
region’s relative vulnerability to attack from both the East and the West.41 
Geographic location also made the Ferghana Valley an important stop along the 
Silk Road. The Ferghana Valley provided markets for local goods and goods from afar 
but also produced many of the goods that went elsewhere along the Silk Road. The 
Ferghana Valley prospered. In Starr’s words, “for centuries, artisans in Aksikent 
fashioned razor-sharp sabers for the immense Chinese market, while other locals 
surpassed most of China in their silk exports to the West.”42 This ancient history of 
Central Asia and the Ferghana Valley—along with more recent motifs, such as British 
geographer Halford J. Mackinder’s theory of a Heartland lying between Europe, Asia, 
                                                 
38 Cummings, Understanding Central Asia, see 145–169. 
39 See Nick Megoran, “For Ethnography in Political Geography: Experiencing and Re-imagining 
Ferghana Valley Boundary Closures,” Political Geography 25, no. 6 (2006): 623; and, Yuri Bregel, 
Historical Atlas of Central Asia, Handbook of Oriental Studies, Section Eight, Central Asia (Leiden, 
Netherlands: Brill, 2003), 95. 
40 Cummings, Understanding Central Asia, 2. 
41 Abdukakhor Saidov, “The Ferghana Valley: The Pre-Colonial Legacy,” in Ferghana Valley, 3. 
42 Starr, introduction to Ferghana Valley, xvii. 
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and the Middle East, and the British–Russian geopolitical competition of the Great 
Game—all further feed the Western imagination and give more reason for speculation 
about intrigue and conflict. 
The Ferghana Valley’s local geography, however, is far more nuanced than the 
typical Western news story about complicated borders or ethnic and religious tensions. 
Over the course of several years of fieldwork in the Ferghana Valley during the early 
2000s, anthropologist Madeleine Reeves crisscrossed the Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek 
borders and transited around multiple enclave checkpoints and gates. Reeves witnessed 
firsthand the diversity in social life and the economy while traveling throughout the 
Ferghana Valley. “To stand at the border and to watch the passing traffic,” Reeves 
contends, “is to glimpse the valley and its life-force in microcosm.”43 One of the striking 
characteristics drawn from Reeves’ description of the border crossing is the diversity in 
relationships that she witnessed during her time in this region.44 Along with the 
ethnographic observations from Reeves, a broader picture emerges from recent 
scholarship of the Ferghana Valley: the interconnectedness of relationships extends 
beyond Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek locals, but also to Russian and Chinese merchants and 
customers, among others. Consensus among scholars of this region is that such 
relationships have been fostered over the course of generations. Understanding these 
nuances is necessary to foreign diplomats and military leaders in order to formulate 
rightly guided policies and direct international aid and security assistance. Too often, 
however, these nuances are either ignored or disregarded by pundits and replaced by 
“catastrophizing” and misinformed speculation.45   
Despite a common history, cultural differences in the Ferghana Valley are 
outwardly apparent, from traditional dress or staple meals to different politics and 
languages. S. Frederick Starr emphasizes the region’s discontinuities as representative of 
                                                 
43 Madeleine Reeves, “Travels in the Margins of the State: Everyday Geography in the Ferghana 
Valley Borderlands,” in Everyday Life, edited by Sahadeo and Zanca, 288. 
44 See Reeves, “Travels in the Margins of the State,” 281–300. For a more in-depth description of 
relationships throughout the Ferghana Valley, see Madeleine Reeves, Border Work: Spatial Lives of the 
State in Rural Central Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). 
45 Starr, introduction to Ferghana Valley, xvii. 
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a “unity that does not exist,”46 although imposed from foreigners. Starr contrasts the 
single name given to the Ferghana Valley, “a name imposed from without,” with “the 
theme of complexity,” but he also suggests that “the three national zones [related to 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan] have as much or more in common with each 
other than they do with the rest of the states of which each is a part.”47 Fixed borders 
meant little until they became internationalized almost overnight following independence 
from the Soviet Union in 1991.48 Surrounded by mountains and fed by its two rivers, the 
Ferghana Valley is rich with cultural contrasts and geographic contradictions. The 
destinies of the communities in the Ferghana Valley on each side of the borders are 
intertwined because of these unique characteristics and connections, in addition to its 
dense population, natural resources and economic interdependence, and similar security 
challenges.  
The political, social, and economic dynamics of the Ferghana Valley are 
interconnected. As Starr concludes, “whatever happens in the valley significantly affects 
all three of these countries in their economic, political, and religious spheres.”49 This 
interconnectedness and interdependence also affect regional security and stability. The 
Valley is therefore also important to the local hegemons of Russia and China. 
Additionally, the European Union and the United States have taken an increased interest 
in the region’s security and stability since the involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) involvement in Afghanistan beginning in 2001. NATO’s 
partnership programs involving the former Soviet republics began in December 1991 
with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and they have continued under the auspices 
of the Alliance’s Partnership for Peace.50 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Cummings, Understanding Central Asia, 5, 152; also, see Reeves, “Fixing the Border,” 905–923. 
49 Starr, introduction to Ferghana Valley, xvii. 
50 See “Partners in Central Asia,” NATO Backgrounders, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 




B. SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE FERGHANA VALLEY 
What have scholars learned about security and stability in the Ferghana Valley? 
This section addresses the security concerns that have justified border hardening between 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, framed by Uzbekistan and interested foreign governments as 
“problems in need of solution.”51 Prior to examining the security challenges of the 
Ferghana Valley, the concepts of security and stability must first be understood. 
1. Security and Stability Defined 
Security and stability are linked within a larger historical and geopolitical context 
understood regionally. State security concerns result from local, national, and 
international threats, while overall stability is dependent on more than the emergent 
threats at various layers of society and within the international environment. While 
suggesting that geopolitics is important but “has to be analyzed in a political 
framework,”52 Barry Buzan also argues that “the concept of security binds together” 
these various strata of agents into a regional security complex.53 “Understanding the 
national security problem” of states, Buzan argues, “requires a wide-ranging 
understanding” of the multiple levels that connect security problems, including the 
regional, state, and individual scales.54  
Comprehensive analyses of security problems contend with a dynamic 
environment of various actors and levels of scale. Security “binds together these levels” 
with “the actors and dynamics from the societal, economic, and environmental sectors,” 
as well as the political and military dimensions.55 Buzan asserts that the pathway toward 
accurate analysis includes the multiple levels, dynamics, and actors “in an integrative 
                                                 
51 Dennis J.D. Sandole, “Central Asia: Managing the Delicate Balance Between the ‘Discourse of 
Danger,’ the ‘Great Game,’ and Regional Problem Solving,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 40, 
no. 2 (2007): 262. doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2007.04.004. 
52 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, 5th 
printing (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 70. 
53 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-




perspective.”56 Finally, Buzan suggests, “A full understanding of each [dynamic] can 
only be gained if it is related to the others.”57 Comprehensive analyses of security 
challenges must be “integrative,” while “attempts to treat security as if it was confined to 
any single level or any single sector invites serious distortions of understanding.”58 
Incorporating legitimacy and social perceptions of authority in regional security 
assessments provides a more complete and nuanced picture that accounts for the 
unintended consequences of the use of force.  
In short, insights provided by Buzan and Wæver—along with those insights 
garnered from critical border studies over the last two decades—suggest that there are 
several core assumptions linking the concepts of stability and security. First, the stability–
security relationship is bidirectional with each affecting the other. Second, history and 
geopolitics contextualize how various agents approach questions related to stability and 
security; these concepts are also deeply geographic and involve interactions between 
borders.59 Third, security and stability problems involve complex political, economic, 
and social elements, while challenges are not confined to a single dimension or 
geographic scale. Security concerns and stability challenges must be understood 
holistically rather than through a single lens, such as the view that violence is caused 
merely by economic or ethnic conflict.60 The challenge for security analysis is 
reconciling the different scales and actors with agency, while also recognizing that the 
state remains the fundamental agent exercising sovereignty, authority, and power within a 
territory.  
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 Buzan, People, States and Fear, 283. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Buzan and Wæver, Regions and Powers, 70. 
60 For analysis of ethnic violence and conflict, see Matthew Lange, Killing Others: A Natural History 
of Ethnic Violence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017). For analysis of the economic and political 
dynamics of violence and conflict, see Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, 
Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). For a dependence on economic explanations for violence and 
conflict, see Jiancai Pi and Pengqing Zhang “Social Conflict and Wage Inequality,” Journal of Economics 
121, no. 1 (2017): 29–49, doi:10.1007/s00712-016-0515-3. 
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Recalling G. John Ikenberry’s definition of stability from Chapter I, the state’s 
ability to “recognize and respond” appropriately to a threat is essential for stability. It is 
the response that is normally associated with security. American political scientist David 
A. Baldwin asks, “Security for whom?”61 This question sharpens the focus for 
considering security in terms of border hardening; specifically, Uzbekistan’s autocratic 
regime seeks security for itself. Baldwin also conceptualizes “security as a policy 
objective distinguishable from others.”62 Instead of assuming security as inherent to 
states, Baldwin recognizes that it “competes with other goals for scarce resources,”63 
while noting that “the use of adjectives permits reference to many different kinds of 
security, e.g., economic security, environmental security, military security, social 
security, physical security, identity security, emotional security, and so on.”64 
Additionally, there are different means toward state security, just as there are different 
means to conduct other state activities. The emphasis, however, is the domination of the 
state and its power and methods to enforce its policy. 
There exists a deep tension between state authority and local autonomy, 
particularly in the realm of security and the use of power to enact rules at the border. 
While most theorists concede that the state may legitimately use force to maintain order 
and security, national interests may conflict with local interests. Stephen E. Hanson notes, 
“political scientists have to date paid relatively little attention to the issue of how political 
elites define and defend particular conceptions of state borders.”65 The defense of 
“particular conceptions of state borders” is not necessarily a military defense. The 
meaning of the border between local and government conceptions is, however, at the 
heart of this thesis: how are borders obeyed and acknowledged as legitimate by the local 
borderland population? The tension between national and local elements of society 
concerning the legitimacy of state authority and state power is especially acute at the 
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border, where loyalties to the state capital can be weaker and relationships across the 
border are inherent in the social and economic spheres of everyday life.  
2. Security in the Ferghana Valley Borderlands 
The border and surrounding borderland constitute a space where the state enforces 
security. Gearóid Ó Tuathail insists, “Monopolizing the right to speak authoritatively 
about ‘security’ in name of everyone—the ability to evoke the ‘national interest’ or a 
universal ‘we’—is at the crux of the practice of power.”66 Autocratic regimes generally 
have a higher level of monopoly on the “security” narrative, as in the case of Uzbekistan, 
despite local and non-state actors competing for the legitimacy to claim security 
prerogatives. As Carl Schmitt argued, “The protego ergo obligo is the cogito ergo sum of 
the state.”67 In other words, providing security is the state’s “core purpose,” according to 
Schmitt’s interpretation of Thomas Hobbes.68 Border enforcement between Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan supports economic, environmental, military, social, physical, and identity 
security. Generally, a state’s enforcement of the border is achieved through coercive or 
normative methods. While most democratic states combine the two means, autocratic 
regimes disproportionately apply coercive border enforcement through means of force in 
order to achieve security. 
While the factors of regional stability include a multitude of political, economic, 
social, and cultural asymmetries, this survey is limited to state security and related 
justifications for border hardening. Ostensibly, the reasons for border hardening are also 
related to the broader regional security concerns for Central Asia and its neighbors. The 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization—of which both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are 
members, along with China, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Tajikistan—repeatedly emphasizes 
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“three evil forces” of “terrorism, extremism, and separatism.”69 Cummings describes the 
change in the emphasis of security concerns following the Cold War, from threats from 
other states to “non-traditional threats,” including “terrorist groupings; transnational 
criminal and drugs trafficking groups; and the depletion of and competition over 
resources and the environment.”70 The emphasis on non-traditional security threats, 
especially with reference to border enforcement, further broadens the state’s control of 
the security narrative. 
Assessments differ widely about the Ferghana Valley’s stability, from a bed of 
instability to an anomaly of tranquility. This dichotomy of two extremes also “frames 
policies and practices of conflict resolution and international aid that themselves 
endanger” Central Asia.71 “Policy making towards Central Asia,” argue Nick Megoran 
and John Heathershaw, “is obstructed by a populist notion of Central Asia as a region of 
danger characterized by terrorism and Islamism, where political conflict is ever ready to 
erupt.”72 While frequently presented as the center of this seething conflict, the Ferghana 
Valley has not met widespread expectations of instability. Stability in the Ferghana 
Valley almost certainly lies somewhere between the two extremes and is more nuanced 
than much of the standard literature.  
Since a primary justification for hardening the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border 
was security-based, it is important to understand how previous researchers assessed the 
potential for conflict as well as what those backing the “danger narrative” determined to 
be the greatest factors of instability. The postulated tensions are based on ethnic, 
religious, economic, and non-traditional threats, resource or environmentally based 
discords, and finally, territorial or border-related disputes. As Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly 
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argued in 2011, “Borders and borderlands…have become geopolitical spaces of 
contentions where asymmetrical economic, social, and political forces are either serving 
or in conflict with the agenda of central governments.”73 While local and regional 
conflicts have been overwhelmingly attributed to ethnic tensions or geopolitically 
incongruent borders, there are also strong narratives that argue that environmental or 
economic factors are sources of ongoing conflict. While the capitals of Kyrgyzstan 
(Dushanbe) and Uzbekistan (Tashkent) manipulate the social, political and economic 
dimensions of life along their national peripheries, the Ferghana Valley satisfies Brunet-
Jailly’s assessment along geopolitical and economic lines. 
Finally, the security concerns of the Ferghana Valley are not easily reconciled 
with the contemporary social and economic challenges facing Uzbekistan. Border 
hardening is arguably detrimental to economic development and prospects for prosperity 
in the borderlands specifically and in the broader regional context. In her assessment of 
the many challenges facing states in the Ferghana Valley, British social anthropologist 
Madeleine Reeves asks several illuminating questions about border enforcement that 
underscore the tension between security and social and economic prosperity. The 
questions posed by Reeves are each contrasted with a “double bind” for an alternative 
path, between one decision or another. These questions point toward the central dilemma 
for all the Ferghana Valley states, but especially for Uzbekistan in light of its unilateral 
border hardening: 
How to have secure borders to prevent gold and other resources from 
being siphoned out, as well as to prevent armed militants from coming in, 
as had occurred during the summers of 1999 and 2000? How to have 
borders that are also permeable to those of us living here who depend on 
being able to move and visit and trade across them? How, especially, to do 
this in a situation where “law,” like “border,” presents itself in absurd 
forms: as an arbitrary, immobile imposition to some, and completely 
permeable to others?74 
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These questions are at the core of the tension for any modern state facing cross-border 
security threats, but that is also burdened with economic and social concerns. The 
government of Uzbekistan is especially hard-pressed to assert its authority, enforce its 
borders, and secure its future given its recent formation as a nation-state and the global 
norm that advocates “secure” borders.  
While an instinctual response to security concerns is to harden the border, how 
does a state absorb the effects that this policy choice has on the economy? Additionally, 
how should the state reconcile security concerns with the need to improve economic and 
social integration with its neighbors? Border hardening between Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan also concerns the local communities in the borderlands because relationships 
are crucial to everyday life. In the borderlands, where social and economic relationships 
have often flourished irrespective of political boundaries, the hardening of the border also 
threatens longstanding familial and tribal identities. These tensions relate to questions of 
security, prosperity, integration, and community relationships, but also influence how the 
population in the borderland perceives authority, especially whether the border rules are 
seen as legitimate. 
C. BORDER STUDIES  
Geography is about power. Although often assumed to be innocent, the 
geography of the world is not a product of nature but a product of histories 
of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, 
occupy, and administer space. 
 —Gearóid Ó Tuathail75 
Border studies concepts and definitions inform the basic conceptual framework of 
this thesis. Borders are more than lines on maps; they are places of interaction. Influenced 
by earlier political geography and different forms of geopolitical inquiry, popular 
discourse about borders is usually related to themes of power and conflict. Furthermore, 
conflict within borderlands should be understood through a historical analysis of that 
particular territory; historical methods of narrative and process tracing are helpful in 
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illustrating a holistic view of conflict and stability and avoiding oversimplifications about 
the factors of conflict at a border. 
1. More than Static Lines: Places of Interaction and Change  
Territory and the borders that define it still matter.76 Since all states have borders, 
there is a general consensus among geographers, sociologists, and political scientists that 
borders are a defining feature of a state. While academic disciplines from international 
relations to anthropology have long studied the role of the border, border studies 
developed in the mid-twentieth century as a unique field of research that focused 
exclusively on borders. Multidisciplinary approaches in border studies—for instance, 
combining historical and sociological methods to understand a bordering process—are 
common. As a division of human geography, border studies regularly draw from a wide 
spectrum of disciplines, including history, international affairs, comparative politics, 
sociology, anthropology, psychology, security studies, and legal studies.77 At the same 
time, there have been considerable changes in the concept of the border and how borders 
are studied.  
Borders represent places of interaction under constant change. While a border can 
be defined simply as “a fixed line that delimits the territory over which a state is 
sovereign,”78 it is far more than a two-dimensional line on a map. Borders are dynamic 
places where power, people, and territory interact with other factors, creating not static 
lines between states but complex and changing border landscapes.79 While German 
geographer and ethnographer Friedrich Ratzel described borders as “the skin of the living 
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state,”80 Julian Minghi referenced Ellen Churchill Semple’s “dynamic view of 
boundaries” that are responsive to both cultural as well as physical pressures and S. 
Whittemore Boggs’ concept that boundaries are places where “‘a sort of osmosis takes 
place,’ the osmotic pressure increasing directly with institutional barriers to 
interactance.”81 A casual observer notices that some borders of a state follow geographic 
or ethnic topography, but in most cases, the political nature of state borders is artificially 
imposed on the land. Borders also differ in the degree that they differentiate people or 
demarcate territory. 
2. Globalization: Borders Never Left, Just Shifted 
In the age of the nation-state, territory is the place where states exercise 
sovereignty. Max Weber’s famous definition of a state was centered on its territorial 
dimension: its “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory.”82 This definition of a state remains valid today, implying the continued 
relevance of territory and physical borders. Calls for a borderless world based on theories 
of globalization83 have been widely rejected, with governments hardening and thickening 
borders since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.84 The number of border fences and 
walls built by states nearly tripled in the twenty years from 1992 to 2012.85 
Enforcement is often accomplished through fences, walls, checkpoints and 
customs inspection areas, visa and passport controls, and taxes, as well as the 
criminalization of illegal crossings. Noel Parker and Rebecca Adler-Nissen build upon 
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Walker’s “politicization of sovereignty”86 and the idea that globalization does not imply 
the end of borders. Their hypothesis contends that bordering practices involve exercising 
sovereignty through “sovereignty games,” that is, the use of physical force, political 
coercion, and legal threats along the state’s border to enforce compliance.87 Elisabeth 
Vallet notes, “Border walls have become…markers of identity, instruments of 
differentiation, tools at the service of State sovereignty.”88 Borders are a visible 
extension of the power of a state, and they “are central features in current international 
disputes relating to security, migration, trade, and natural resources.”89 Borders function 
to include and exclude, creating the alterity of the other through the “politics of 
boundaries.”90  
Several early researchers identified borders with the central control of the state. A. 
E. Moodie, reports Minghi, “reasoned that, as boundaries epitomized the growth of 
centralization of authority and power of the states they divided, the functions of a 
boundary were derived, not from the nature of the line, but from the nature of the 
communities it separated.”91 Ladis D. Kristof’s theoretical formulation of boundaries as 
“inner-oriented, the outer line of effective control of the central government, and 
indicated the range and vigor of centripetal forces,”92 is applicable to understanding the 
focus of this thesis: the nexus between local border dynamics, national border policies, 
and conflict. Laim O’Dowd argues that “a more reflective and empirical historical 
analysis for interpreting border change” demonstrates not a “borderless world,” but 
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instead a “world of borders.”93 While some scholars describe borders as ungoverned 
spaces, part of the periphery of the state, on the edges of power, where the state’s 
monopoly on force is limited,94 others recognize that most borders are instituted, 
enforced, and monopolized by states.95 
3. Historical Sense of Borders as Places of Conflict  
While many military professionals lack formal training in political geography, 
they are familiar with popularized geopolitical accounts of borders and conflict.96 While 
Robert Kaplan and like-minded authors consider borders in relation to conflict, their 
analyses are less focused on local dynamics at the border than on international dynamics. 
This pedagogy shaped much of the early discourse in border studies and, while recent 
scholarship reflects a liberalizing of disciplines and approaches, standard perceptions that 
shape public opinion and policy formation are still grounded in legacy studies.  
Conflict and the pursuit of stability have been central to geography and the study 
of borders since the early twentieth century.97 The discipline of political geography, for 
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instance, analyzes the “ways in which politics and conflict create spaces and places and, 
in turn, are themselves partially determined by the existence and nature of geographical 
entities.”98 Political geography is naturally concerned with the interaction of territory, 
people, the state, and power. Megoran notes, “the scholarship of three particularly 
influential geographers—Friedrich Ratzel, Halford Mackinder, and Nicholas Spykman—
was central to these connections between geography, the state and warcraft,” in the 
development of geopolitics.99 
State security concerns, as well as the institutional evolution of borders, often 
revolve around some form of conflict. More specifically, the bordering and de-bordering 
described earlier by Brunet-Jailly, as well as the process of border hardening, result more 
often than not from territorial conflict. While cartographers draw borderlines as markers 
of state sovereignty on two-dimensional maps, Jonathan Goodhand argues that borders 
and associated borderlands are “central to the dimensions of war and peace.”100 Borders 
are “sites of political struggles, contestation, and renegotiation,” and inherently mark 
territories of both conflict and cooperation.101  
4. Contextualizing Border Conflict with Historical Narrative 
Views on the functions of borders today are also linked with historical factors that 
define the state as it is today. From the Westphalian sovereignty of the seventeenth 
century to the nation-state alignment after the two world wars of the twentieth century, 
borders retain a special place in international law through the United Nations Charter and 
multiple conventions. Such a view, however, is more aligned with the actual functioning 
of borders in Europe and North America. The imposition of idealized Western-style 
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borders in the Ferghana Valley—at a minimum, through foreign aid and security 
assistance programs—becomes relevant for how the global border norms contextualize 
state security policies and local border dynamics. 
Contradictions arise along borders in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa or Central 
Asia, where the lines were drawn more recently and not as a result of war or longer-term 
historical developments. Describing Afghanistan and the borders of Central Asia, Helena 
Rytövuori-Apunen argues that such regions do not have “a solid historical basis” for 
demarcated borders; essentially, the “tradition has only shallow roots” for borders.102 
Rytövuori-Apunen suggests broadening border study research, particularly in the cases of 
border hardening, beyond “the borderline and the management practices expected to ‘filter’ 
interaction between states” and not focusing only on “events as ‘incidents’ (border 
incidents, violent incidents) as if they occurred only sporadically,” but within “temporal 
layers” and a historical context.103 The historical context of the Ferghana Valley 
contributes not only to a richer understanding of conflict but also to a deeper 
comprehension of border processes, such as the border hardening between Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. 
5. Evaluating Borders legitimation 
Recent scholarship in border studies explores questions of place in relation to 
borders, that is, “where do we look for evidence of bordering practices and what are the 
impacts on particular places?”104 Other questions consider the performance of borders, 
asking, how are borders materialized and experienced?105 The different perspectives of 
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border analysis ask “who borders?” and consider the politicizing of borders, which 
demonstrates the “complicated relationship between state power and space.”106 Outlined 
by Corey Johnson and Reece Jones, the four “p’s” of place, performance, perspective, 
and politics are lenses to analyze the complex dynamics of borders and borderlands.107 
Borders become zones of political, cultural, and socio-economic interaction among 
people of different identities. According to Dennis Rumley and Julian Minghi, co-editors of 
the 1991 book The Geography of Border Landscapes, four characteristics of the border 
landscape can be evaluated: political, social, economic, and interstate interactions.108 All 
four themes are relevant to studying border landscapes from within a state or across 
international borders, especially when considering questions of security or stability. 
Borders are central to security and military operations but they should not only be 
thought of as barriers. As Jussi P. Laine argues, “State borders are complex and dynamic 
multiscalar entities that have different symbolic and material forms maintained by a 
multiplicity of bordering processes and practices.”109 Appreciation for the complexity of 
borders remains two-dimensional, limited to a static line that serves as a kind of 
perimeter or barrier to the movement of people and material. Borders are centers of local 
interaction, points of contact between groups, important indicators of other social or 
political stressors. David Newman suggests that “borders come to life” with the bottom-
up narrative from the borderlands.110 The familial and local level is where people often 
determine loyalties toward the regime or other competing narratives, whether supportive 
or disruptive of the status quo.  
The border is also a place of work for the security personnel and bureaucrats who 
implement the border rules. Madeleine Reeves examines the dynamics of border life from 
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the perspective of both the border guards and the people who live in the shadow of the 
border; her book-length examination epitomizes the bottom-up approach to border 
analysis with a focus on the border institution.111 This is the meaning of the “bottom-up” 
and “top-down” analysis of borders. Political and military appreciation for the utility of 
borders is also too frequently limited to the level of the state or the strategic level, rather 
than identifying tactical and operational concerns for the role of borders.112  
Understanding borders from the bottom-up local level provides deeper insight into 
how borders affect stability. As Yves Lacoste states, “a geopolitical situation is defined, 
at a given moment in historical evolution, by rivalries between powers on a relatively 
large scale, and by relationships between forces in different parts of the territory in 
question.”113 Lacoste describes how “power rivalries, both official and 
unofficial...develop within many states where minority populations claim either their 
autonomy or their independence…[while] geopolitical rivalries exist within a single 
country between the main political parties who are seeking to extend their influence in a 
particular region or town.”114  
These official and unofficial power rivalries—especially those between the local 
populations who experience or challenge the bordering regime’s rules—are not two-sided 
but multi-dimensional. While the local populations amount to varying groups vying for 
influence and advantage, the different levels of government—from national down to local 
or tribal—also contend to define their territorial advantage. Borderlands are especially 
complicated regions because of their diversity and the multiple scales of agency, 
including varying cultural, social, political, economic, and social relationships. 
The politically powerful or so-called “peripheral elites” are also viewed as 
integral to extending state power to the borders and shaping the overall prospects for 
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stability.115 With the turn toward localizing border studies and the focus on conflict, it is 
reasonable to ask how local border dynamics affect stability. The school of critical 
geopolitics represents this recent trend in political geography to localize conflict, in 
contrast with earlier scholarship that regionalized or globalized dynamics around 
borders.116 A focus on the world scale has been common in border studies, especially in 
the context of globalization and international governmental organizations (IGO) and 
transnational organizations.117  
6. Definitions and Core Concepts: Territory in a State’s Foreign Policy 
As an academic discipline, border studies emerged in part from scholars 
“interested in investigating how the state sustained its historically dominant role as an 
arbiter of control, violence, order and organization for those whose identities were being 
transformed by world forces.”118 While border research is now an expansive field, the 
trend since the end of the Cold War has been toward “an interest in what the lives of 
borderland peoples were like” and away from analyzing questions related to “the political 
economy of the territory.”119 These are commonly understood as “national,” 
“international,” or “interstate” borders rather than intra-state borders that define sub-
territories of a state. More specifically, an interstate border defines the physical limit of 
the state’s sovereign territory; it is expressly political in nature, defining the physical 
limit of a particular political entity.  
The physical aspect of territory must also be emphasized because states act 
outside their defined physical borders—legally—through various treaties, by procedures 
for the extradition of criminals, and at diplomatic facilities abroad, etc. Definitions 
                                                 
115 Jonathan Goodhand, “War, Peace and the Places in Between: Why Borderlands are Central,” eds. 
M, Pugh et al., In Whose peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 225, 240. 
116 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Localizing Geopolitics: Disaggregating Violence and Return in Conflict 
Regions,” Political Geography 29, no. 5 (2010): 256–265. 
117 Johnson, Jones, Paasi, Amoore, Mountz, Salter, and Rumford, “Interventions on Rethinking ‘the 
Border’ in Border Studies,” 61. 
118 Wilson and Donnan, “Borders and Border Studies,” A Companion to Border Studies, 5. 
119 Ibid., 5–6. 
 37
related to territory and borders vary considerably, depending on the academic discipline 
that defines them or the specific research agenda. This section provides the basic 
definitions and core concepts for use throughout the thesis. Beyond discussing definitions 
and core concepts, it is necessary to dispel suggestions that borders are somehow less 
relevant in the twenty-first century than in the past. 
Borders are literally everywhere, with states exercising more power at the edge of 
their territories than arguably ever before. As Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan 
note in their Companion to Border Studies, “There are more international borders in the 
world today than ever there were before.”120 The study of borders waned following the 
end of the Cold War, as calls for a “borderless world” were underpinned by concepts for 
economic and social flattening through globalization. Cosmopolitanism and the 
enthusiasm for globalization were not necessarily malicious, simply misguided. These 
perceptions of a newfound liberty from borders were arguably built on post-Soviet 
Western triumphalism and euphoria, in addition to the preceding years of relative border 
stability. In a 1982 essay entitled “The Political Problems of Frontier Regions” Malcolm 
Anderson held that border disputes were “an insignificant feature of European 
politics,”121 an understandable observation given the contrast with an earlier generation’s 
turmoil involving World War II and post-colonial nationalism. In comparison, the Cold 
War might now be characterized by an almost frozen state in European borders.  
Writing prior to the signing of the Schengen Agreement in 1985, Anderson 
considered this frozen state of borders as hazardous to the regional stability of Europe. 
Anderson was concerned that the “very stability of international boundaries” in Europe 
caused “rigidity” and might adversely impact economic and social activities.122 This 
border rigidity began fading as a result of the end of the Cold War, including the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. 
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Additionally, once the Schengen Agreement entered into “full force in 1995,”123 citizens 
within the Schengen zone moved about “unhindered across open borders.”124 European 
and Eurasian borders continued shifting in meaning through the 1990s, with the pressures 
of non-traditional threats, such as terrorism, again hardening borders in the twenty-first 
century. 
Recent history of changing borders challenges the “end of history” and 
“borderless world” theses, both contradicted by the border realities of the former Soviet 
Union. An example of the increased production of borders in the post-Soviet (and post-
Yugoslav) space is that “20 of the 36 new UN members after 1990 are from Central, 
Eastern and South-eastern Europe.”125 While dialogue in the 1990s among academics 
and policy-makers held that “we were all living in a world where state borders were 
increasingly obsolete, where porous international borders no longer fulfilled their 
historical role as barriers to the movement of aliens and citizens, and as markers of the 
extent and power of the state,”126 the collective twenty-first century dialogue appears 
more sober. Given the securitization of borders following the 9/11 attacks and the rise of 
global terrorism as well as transnational criminal organizations, “there are more states, 
more state institutions, more state intrusion into the daily lives of citizens and denizens 
(through the utilization of new technologies), and more state intervention into global 
political economy,” than ever before in history.127  
The paradox of the twenty-first century resides in the tension between two 
seemingly contradictory but simultaneous worlds: one that is ever more connected 
through communications, social media, and transportation networks, and one that is 
increasingly partitioned, divided, and separated through economic, social, cultural, 
political, security, and educational borders. Particularly since the disintegration of the 
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Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1991, this diversity in the types and forms of borders has 
been the focus of geographers, anthropologists, and sociologists, among other scholars. 
Geographer Anna Krasteva identifies the “political logic” that stems from two different 
“constructions” of borders: “top-down and bottom-up.”128 Krasteva further elaborates 
with different “conceptual” frameworks of border thinking, including “power, 
sovereignty, security” and “identities, symbols, imaginaries.”129 It is necessary to 
understand how borders impact individuals and communities, as well as how political 
elites perceive state borders. 
The overall distinction of these two methods, however, is between boundary and 
border studies. The former explores “the scholarly fascination with this intersection of the 
metaphorical negotiations of borderlands of personal and group identity,” while the latter 
(which is more relevant to this research) seeks to explain aspects of “the geopolitical 
realization of international, state and other borders of polity, power, territory and 
sovereignty.”130 Ultimately, border studies add to an already rich multidisciplinary body 
of research on the nexus with the state, territory, and use of power. These are core 
concepts of Weber’s sociological theory of the state, legitimacy, and obedience.  
Political borders are also “artificial” in the sense that they are constructed. David 
Newman claims without controversy that “there are no ‘natural’ borders as such—all 
borders are social constructions, delimited and demarcated by people.”131 Walter 
Leimgruber asserts strongly that “boundaries,” used interchangeably here with borders, 
“are thus social constructs, conditioned by our perception of an attitude towards 
space.”132 Borders are important to states because they “create difference.”133 In 
actuality, borders do not create the difference between groups but define and mark the 
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difference created through other processes, which precipitates alterity.134 Regardless, 
Newman is correct to argue, “The existence of borders enables us to maintain some sort 
of order, both within the spaces and groups which are thus encompassed, as well as 
between ‘our’ compartment and that of the ‘other’ groups and spaces which are part of a 
broader system of global ordering.”135 This process of bordering brings about alterity 
between those in the state and those outside the line. Such “othering” can be deeply 
emotional and politically powerful when there are questions over which state has 
legitimate claims to a certain disputed space.  
This thesis deals with interstate borders at the physical edge of a state’s territory, 
and several core concepts are used in border studies to characterize this space. Beyond 
the borderline itself, there is the broader application of a boundary, as well as distinctions 
concerning frontiers and borderlands. This thesis uses historian Bradley J. Parker’s 
approach toward these concepts of space, merging the political and geopolitical nuances 
when it might further clarify the concept for the purposes of this thesis. The concepts are 
dealt with from the general to the specific, from the vague to the clear. 
Parker defines a borderland as a space “around or between political or cultural 
entities where geographic, political, demographic, cultural, and economic circumstances 
or processes may interact to create borders or frontiers.”136 One nuance from a frontier is 
that a borderland emphasizes the constructive interaction between different groups of 
people. The lack of symmetry among different definitions from the various disciplines 
using these terms further complicates the use of these concepts in literature, media, 
policy-making, and academia. While historians and anthropologists define a borderland 
differently, both usually describe it as “a geopolitical space.”137 As a geopolitical 
concept, borderlands are the “regions around or between political or cultural entities—the 
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geographic space in which frontiers and borders are likely to exist.”138 Borderlands exist 
under multiple conditions of border types; while conflict might sometimes stem from 
these areas, borderlands may also be places of commerce, innovation, blended cultures, 
and mixed political loyalties.  
Parker defines boundaries as the “unspecific divides or separators that indicate 
limits of various kinds.”139 A boundary “encompasses the more specific terms border and 
frontier.”140 Boundaries are part of the borderland landscape and might include the 
border or an aspect of natural geography, such as mountain ranges, large bodies of water, 
or deserts. Both terms have meanings that have morphed in the last century of usage. As 
the concepts become more specific, Parker proposes that “there are two types of 
boundaries that may occur in borderlands: borders and frontiers.”141 Both of these terms 
have also changed in meaning over the last century.  
Given the many definitions for the geopolitical terms frontier and border, the 
Oxford English Dictionary (OED) offers a helpful starting reference. A frontier, according 
to the OED, is “The part of a country which fronts or faces another country; the marches; 
the border or extremity conterminous with that of another.”142 Specifically related to the 
settlement of the United States, frontier means “That part of a country which forms the 
border of its settled or inhabited regions.” Both definitions refer to an area at the edge of 
settlement, just before the territory is considered “wild,” as with the American Wild West. 
Parker describes a frontier as “a zone of interpenetration between two previously distinct 
peoples…[that] could separate various types of political and cultural units and [notes] that 
such zones may also be made up of empty areas where no such units exist or where they do 
not come onto direct physical contact.”143 Frontiers are more specific than a boundary, but 
still “fuzzy” in terms of their exact geographic point on a map.  
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Frontiers are also spaces defined by generalizations, such as marking the space 
from one area to another. Parker broadens the definition beyond a natural feature, noting, 
“frontiers are made up of various types of boundaries including, for example, geographic, 
political, demographic, cultural, and economic boundaries.”144 Traditional or charismatic 
borders are more likely to be defined by frontier spaces, while those bounded by legal-
rational legitimacy depend on the processes of delimitation and eventual demarcation to 
specify the lines on a map and the ground. Frontiers are a “complicated matrix of 
overlapping boundaries,”145 whose lack of clarity itself might produce different 
perceptions about a border’s legitimacy and a country’s territorial sovereignty. The use of 
the term “frontier” is more common among political geographers or sociologists to connote 
the decrease in enforced political order at the margins in relation to the center of the state; 
anthropologists and geographers who practice ethnography might prefer the term 
“borderlands” to identify and emphasize the territory around borders as a point of 
interaction.  
Borders are easier to define than frontiers because they are usually associated with 
a “line in the sand.”146 The OED defines a border as “The boundary line which separates 
one country from another, the frontier line.”147 More narrowly, borders are the “linear 
dividing lines, fixed in a particular space, meant to mark the division between political 
and/or administrative units.”148 Parker recognizes that “when one leaves one country to 
enter another, one crosses the ‘border’ that is a tangible line between separate political or 
administrative entities,” but he also observes that the “borders of modern nation states do 
not necessarily govern other types of boundaries,” such as “divisions between ethnic or 
linguistic groups.”149 Borders hold powerful potential as symbols, cultural and political, 
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for the state and opposing narratives. Parker also describes borders as “a type of 
division,” with a primary characteristic “that they mark political, administrative, and in 
most cases also military, boundaries.”150 Based on the different types of border 
management throughout the world, depending on one’s status as “the Other” or as part of 
the group, border-crossing can be either an extremely challenging endeavor or an action 
as smoothly accomplished as swiping one’s identification in a scanner. Borders continue 
in the twenty-first century to control the flow of people and goods, while symbolizing the 
control of the state at its edge. 
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III. BORDERS, INSTITUTIONS, AND LEGITIMACY 
And you must consider: If you commit extortion against the peasants, take 
their oxen and seed, and cause their crops to be consumed, what will you 
do in the future? 
   — Ghāzān Khān, 13th Century Mongol Emperor151 
The statement by the thirteenth century Mongol emperor Ghāzān Khān suggests a 
deep understanding about the role of legitimacy in state power and authority, especially 
when exercised against the marginalized. Prior to focusing on border hardening and local 
perceptions in the Ferghana Valley, this chapter considers more broadly the role of 
borders as institutions, the concept of legitimacy of borders, and border hardening as an 
institutional process that affects legitimacy. Border hardening is also considered in 
relation to stability and the prevailing global norm of fixed borders.  
A. BORDERS AS AN INSTITUTION 
The institutional nature of borders forms the first assumption underpinning the 
conceptual framework of this thesis. While this thesis explores the role of legitimacy, the 
object of legitimacy is the border as an institution. American political scientist Stephen E. 
Hanson asserts “that state borders are, in essence, a type of political institution.”152 
Generally, institutions are crucial for the political, economic, and social ordering of a 
population within a territory. Indeed, borders are one of the most visible institutions of a 
state and a tangible sign of state sovereignty for those communities living in the 
borderlands. Marking not only the territorial divide between two sovereign states, a 
border institution also propagates state authority at the edge or periphery of a state. The 
border institution communicates rules—whether political, economic, or social in nature—
that the state, in turn, expects the population to obey.  
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1. Institutions: Theory and Definition 
Before describing the institutional nature of borders, it is useful to explore the 
theoretical concept of institutions in relation to rules. The scholarly disciplines of history, 
law, political philosophy, economics, sociology, and international relations, as well as 
other social sciences have all influenced the development of Western institutional theory. 
Adam Smith attempted to explain how societies, economies, and governments were 
structured in his 1759 book The Theory of Moral Sentiments and his 1776 treatise The 
Wealth of Nations.153 Since Smith’s publications in the eighteenth century, institutional 
theory has developed into multiple theories and concepts regarding social and political 
structure and behavior.154 According to American political scientist B. Guy Peters, “the 
roots of political science are” in fact “in the study of institutions.”155 In as much as 
border institutions propagate territorial order through formal rules, institutional theory 
explains how rules relate to legitimacy, perceptions, and stability. 
Rules are central to the nature of an institution. German socio-economist Wolfram 
Elsner explores the role of institutions in influencing behavior.156 “An institution,” 
according to Elsner, is “a decision or behavior rule (or pattern of behavior) governing the 
activities of individuals in recurrent multipersonal situations.”157 Elsner’s definition is 
useful particularly because it elaborates on the relationship between the institution, its 
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particular rules, and individual as well as social (i.e., multipersonal) behavior. Elsner 
elaborates on this relationship: 
The rule is generally acknowledged within the community, thus providing 
the basis for consistent mutual expectations regarding decisions or 
behavior, including the expectation that deviation from the rule will be 
subject to a negative sanction, thereby leaving the individual worse off 
than in case of a general conformance to the rule. The general validity 
(that is, acknowledgement) of the rule is based upon either of the 
following: (1) the individual’s willingness to obey the rule provided that 
other individuals do the same; or (2) the certain knowledge that deviation 
from the rule will result in an effective negative sanction.158 
The central theme in Elsner’s explanation is that institutional rules form a common 
expectation “regarding decisions or behavior” within society. Additionally, rule 
“validity” or “acknowledgement” is based on two assumptions: that individual obedience 
is influenced by the other’s “willingness to obey the rule” and that “deviation” from these 
rules necessarily earns the violator a negative sanction. Finally, institutions make rules 
that are intended to govern individual and social behavior. This last assumption forms 
one of the principal premises discussed in Chapter V. 
An institution—as with the later concept of legitimacy—is a vaguer term in the 
social sciences than some would like because it governs through both formal and 
informal rules. The border institution is certainly governed by formal rules, but informal 
social and cultural rules also dictate behavior in the borderlands. Nobel laureate and 
economist Douglass North defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interaction,” consisting “of both informal 
constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal 
rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).”159 Ethnographic narratives are particularly 
valuable for analyzing the structure of society and thereby assessing the various types of 
rules proposed by the state at the border. “Institutions,” as North contends, “have been 
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devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange.”160 While 
formal rules are more straightforward and often are written down, an institution’s 
informal rules require observation and more critical study of a social order to determine 
how behavior is governed.  
Institutions put forth rules that influence social behavior and perceptions. As 
Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio argue, “institutional arrangements and social 
processes matter.”161 These political and social structures are especially important to any 
comprehensive account of conflict and stability within the borderlands of the Ferghana 
Valley. Drawing from recent developments in “new institutionalism,” Powell and 
DiMaggio insist that “individual preferences and such basic categories of thought as the 
self, social action, the state, and citizenship are shaped by institutional forces.”162 As 
discussed in the next section, influence among the border institution, social behavior, and 
local perceptions is multidirectional.  
2. Conceiving of the Border Institution  
As previously established, a border is an institution. Therefore, analysis of borders 
can encompass the various tools and concepts used to understand and evaluate other 
political institutions. Before discussing institutional stability and legitimacy, this section 
considers more deeply the consequences of thinking about borders as institutions. 
Consistent with themes in past and contemporary border studies that explain borders as 
constructed and artificial, Hanson suggests, “Like all political institutions, they [the 
borders] do not emerge ‘naturally’ out of any preordained process of social evolution; 
rather, state borders must be designed and enforced by specific actors in specific 
historical contexts.”163 The historical context is especially important for the Ferghana 
Valley because borders were the result of an almost purely scientific design based on the 
ethno-linguistic ordering of the early Soviet planners. Additionally, the borders in the 
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Ferghana Valley have never been static but have always been changing, the result of 
regional, national, and local influences.  
 As institutions, borders are historical and sociological, evolving over time 
through the social interactions of people. Brunet-Jailly notes that borders are made 
through a historical process, “which at a given time in history and within a given space—
are economically, politically and culturally embedded.”164 According to Brunet-Jailly, 
“there is a wealth of scholarly characterizations of borders, boundaries and borderlands, 
where non-central-state actors, pluri-national communities, and stateless nations perforate 
borders or undermine the integrity of state borders because of ethnic, religious, social and 
economic identities.”165 Brunet-Jailly suggests that border studies should “focus on the 
agency of borders that is the activities of social, economic and political individuals and 
the processes of production and re-production of borders—the bordering and de-
bordering praxis.”166 These characterizations reinforce the idea that political borders as 
institutions evolve over time through social and economic interaction.  
Beyond functioning as a central feature of the state, borders define the people by 
defining the territory. Borders are part of multidimensional state processes of de-
territorializing and re-territorializing people and places.167 As described by Brunet-Jailly, 
“Borders are not just hard territorial lines—they are institutions that result from bordering 
policies—they are thus about people.”168 Mostly, borders differentiate the people from 
outsiders, as other political institutions distinguish citizens from foreigners. “For most 
settled territories,” acknowledged Brunet-Jailly, borders “are predominantly about 
inclusion and exclusion, as they are woven into varied cultural, economic and political 
fabrics.”169 By their nature as barriers of exclusion and inclusion, borders are central to 
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regional prospects for stability. Wherever there is a group of people, there are others who 
are excluded. This exclusion or inclusion process through the border—especially 
hardening—is a potential source of conflict and instability.  
The relationship between the border institution and the borderland people is also 
mutually interactive. Borders between two states “are the outcome of the continual 
interactions and intersections between the actions of people (agency) within the 
constraints and limits placed by contextual and structural factors (structure).”170 As 
Elsner and North pointed out, a successful institution increases order and stability 
through rules that govern behavior. These rules influence behavior and shape 
perceptions,171 as well as have tangible effects on the social and economic dynamics of 
the borderland. The border can negatively affect nearly every aspect of life when 
experienced by local communities as imposing, while the border can also shape local 
perceptions of the state and political authority. While the border can degrade everyday 
life by restricting social and economic relationships, local perceptions can also shape the 
formulation and implementation of border rules. In other words, the structural and 
institutional nature of the border is shaped—inferring from Brunet-Jailly’s understanding 
of border production and evolution—by the behavior and perceptions of the population.  
3. From Border Institutions to Relative Stability 
Stable borders are themselves stabilizing in the greater geopolitical and 
sociological context of a region. As a border institution effectively increases order and 
decreases uncertainty, according to North, regional stability should also logically 
increase.172 Drawing on Max Weber’s earlier articulation of institutions, Hanson argues 
that in the context of borders, “where institutions are stable and predictable, everyday 
decision making will typically be governed by habit and short-term instrumental 
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rationality.”173 Beyond everyday habits, this short-term instrumental rationality can also 
be understood as behavior according to interests. The unique context of the Ferghana 
Valley—specifically, the construction of hardened borders after a long history of open 
borders as well as the self-fulfilling “danger narrative” that reinforces the perception of 
uncertainty—arguably challenges local perceptions and shapes behavior that would 
otherwise be dictated by habit or rational choice. These historical and contextual 
circumstances—potential factors of instability—may threaten how people have lived and 
expect to live in the Ferghana Valley borderlands. 
Drawing from concepts of institutional theory, the relationship between 
institutions and rules is also an important aspect affecting the survival and stability of an 
institution. John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan considered how “institutional rules function 
as myths which organizations incorporate, gaining legitimacy, resources, stability, and 
enhanced survival prospects.”174 Other scholars have observed, based on conclusions 
drawn from Meyer and Rowan, that institutions that “fail to verify their activities against 
legitimacy are vulnerable to claims of negligence and necessity.”175 The role that 
perceptions of legitimacy play is also not to be underestimated. “The perception of 
legitimacy is essential for social stability,” argues Kylie Fisk. In his view, “when it exists 
in the thinking of people and groups, it leads them to defer to authorities, institutions, and 
social arrangements as right and proper.”176 When legitimacy is weak or lacking, 
institutional authority is undermined and stability is threatened.177 Based on a study of 
post-conflict regions in Asia, Fisk concludes that legitimacy is “essential for citizen 
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compliance and long-term stability.”178 Popular deference to the institutional authority of 
a border also logically reduces the operating costs of enforcing the border because the 
baseline population respects and honors the border rules. Therefore, the state has more 
resources to commit to actual security threats, while also minimizing state intrusions into 
everyday life. 
B. LEGITIMACY OF BORDERS: DEFINITIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND 
EVALUATION 
This section addresses institutional legitimacy and the related methods by which 
states gain social obedience to institutional rules. Institutional legitimacy is defined as 
popular acceptance of the institution’s right to exercise authority, especially in the form 
of rules and requests.179 Beyond the use of raw power, the concept of legitimacy is a 
particular form of political authority that allows states—and by extension, their 
institutions—to govern effectively, as well as to persist with popular support. Following 
this definition, additional concepts of legitimacy are explored and the role of local 
perceptions of border legitimacy is considered in relation to institutional stability. 
Scholars from numerous disciplines have explored the concept of legitimacy, 
including those working within international relations, comparative politics, sociology, 
psychology, and political philosophy. International relations literature seeks to 
understand international legitimacy as an aspect of interstate relations. Scholars of 
comparative politics and political philosophy often analyze legitimacy in terms of 
democracy and the consent of the people.180 This approach is not easily transferable to 
understanding legitimacy in autocratic regimes, such as Uzbekistan. Some of the more 
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recent advances the study of legitimacy has been in criminology and psychology, both 
heavily influenced from earlier sociology scholars, such as structural functionalist Talcott 
Parsons.181 A useful conception of legitimacy that pertains to borders and local 
perceptions ultimately incorporates contributions from multiple scholarly disciplines, 
while accounting for the philosophical nuances that make legitimacy such a powerful 
force.  
While a comprehensive review of legitimacy as a concept is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, political philosophy is an appropriate starting point for understanding its value 
when applied to borders and stability. Political thought has often problematized 
legitimacy.182 French–American lawyer and political theorist Jean-Marc Coicaud asserts, 
“Legitimacy is essential to the operation of political life.”183 In other words, legitimacy is 
a question for theorists with real-world application: “What makes a government 
legitimate?”184 American political philosopher Peter G. Stillman recalls just some of the 
notable scholars that considered the concept of legitimacy—from Plato and Aristotle to 
Rousseau, and later Max Weber, Hannah Arendt, Robert Dahl, David Easton, and 
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Seymour Lipset.185 Other commentators on the subject might place Thomas Hobbes, 
John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, and John Rawls at the top of their lists when discussing 
notable theorists who have pondered the concept of legitimacy. What can be gained from 
listing these notable scholars? The answer resides in the remarkable diversity of thought 
stemming from how each philosopher asked questions regarding state legitimacy. 
Because legitimacy continues to be of primary concern to political theorists, this section 
addresses some of the definitions and descriptions that have immediate pertinence to this 
thesis. 
1. Definition and Distinctions 
This thesis uses a definition of legitimacy that is subjective based on perceptions 
of rightness rather than an objective, universalized normative recognition. Defined in the 
political sense, “legitimacy is the recognition of the right to govern.”186 Consistent with 
the earlier definition of institutional legitimacy, this definition emphasizes the 
subjectivity of the governed through elements of perception and recognition, while 
underscoring questions of the rightness of an authority. First, legitimacy depends on 
recognition of the governed, which is described later as the social perception of local 
borderland people about the border institution. Second—although legitimacy is not based 
on a universal moral norm—it is at least partially normative, having to do with the 
institution’s right to govern a population. From this right of authority stems the sense of 
justice or injustice associated with legitimate and illegitimate authority. Finally, there is 
the basic question, what state or institution is governing whom? The simple answer is that 
the border institution governs the people living near and crossing the Uzbekistan–
Kyrgyzstan border in the Ferghana Valley. The border institution, therefore, gains or 
loses subjective legitimacy—at least in part—through local perceptions of its authority to 
make rules and requests.  
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Legitimacy is naturally related to the concepts of power and authority. Drawing 
from a tension addressed by Raymond Aron in Democracy and Totalitarianism: A 
Theory of Political Systems, Jean-Marc Coicaud argues, “to justify power and obedience 
simultaneously is the first issue involved in the question of legitimacy.”187 The insight 
here is that authority is distinct from the raw use of power. Certain methods of state 
power, such as the use of violence and coercion, do not require legitimate authority to 
enforce a rule. Such methods, in fact, are illegitimate by definition unless employed in 
the service of justice. French statesman and political philosopher Jacques Maritain 
upholds this distinction that “authority and power are two different things.”188 
Specifically, “authority means right,” while “power is the force by means of which” a 
state imposes its rules.189 The difference is important for Maritain because “power 
without authority is tyranny.”190 Tyranny is the exercise of pure power without the rule 
of law and the consent of those governed. Pure power is therefore illegitimate. Both Aron 
and Maritain lived through the tyrannical violence of the early twentieth century and 
were interested in the concept of legitimacy, and especially, how power and authority 
were legitimized through ideologies. 
Consequently, coercive power is unstable. More specifically, while coercion 
through the use of force is a historic reality and legitimate when applied justly, the use of 
pure power represents illegitimate authority. This illegitimacy of some forms of coercion 
leads to institutional instability. While not denying the reality and influence of coercive 
power, the question is whether such illegitimate authority can endure or survive without 
benefiting from alternative forms of authority, such as interest or legitimacy.  
Canadian-born American historian William H. McNeill argues that “throughout 
nearly all civilized history, in any given place, a particular group of armed men did in fact 
extract unrequited rents and taxes from their subjects until another similar group came 
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along and displaced them.”191 Armed men do, in fact, force compliance and therefore, 
influence social and political behavior for at least as long as that threat of force is 
perceived as credible. In other words, coercive authority, without recourse to justice-
based authority and despite being illegitimate, does force people to comply with 
institutional rules and to accept an established institutional order. Compliance that 
endures is arguably based on legitimacy. British-born American political scientist Bruce 
Gilley notes that “empirical studies have confirmed the centrality of legitimacy beliefs to 
citizen compliance.”192 Despite the fact that “armed men demanding submission do not 
offer their victims much choice,”193 the population’s compliance is arguably only 
extracted through either the immediate presence of force or the real and perceived threat 
of force. An illegitimate authority must eventually depend on alternative means of 
authority, risk loss of consent and eventual rebellion, or fall to another authority that 
exercises more power over the governed. Ultimately, institutions depending on legitimate 
authority and the consent of the governed are more stable than despotic regimes, a fact 
which affects the social and political stability within the region. 
Hannah Arendt suggests that confusion between violence and authority is 
common and leads to a fundamental misunderstanding about legitimacy in the political 
order. “Since authority always demands obedience,” Arendt notes, “it is commonly 
mistaken for some form of power or violence.”194 Furthermore, argues Arendt, “authority 
precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, authority itself has 
failed.”195 For Arendt, “authority has proved to be the most stable element,”196 which 
makes it all the more important to understand how authority is perceived as legitimate. 
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Legitimate authority, according to Arendt, provides for a more stable regime than the use 
of force. 
The recognition of the governed is obtained through the process of legitimation. 
By one account, legitimation is “the process whereby power gains acceptance in the eyes 
of those who are governed by it, by generating a belief in its legitimacy.”197 Similarly, 
German political scientist Johannes Gerschewski defines legitimation “as the process of 
gaining support, which is based on an empirical, Weberian tradition of ‘legitimacy 
belief.’”198 Neither of these two definitions proposes a legitimation based on mere 
technical legality without normative standing among the population. For British 
international theorist Adam Watson, legitimacy is defined as “the acceptance of 
authority, the right of a rule or a ruler to be obeyed, as distinguished from the power to 
coerce.”199 Like Arendt, Watson argues that the “power exercised by compulsion or the 
threat of it”200 is not legitimate authority. Watson also notes the relative importance of 
individual perceptions of institutional authority. “Legitimacy,” Watson suggests, “is the 
lubricating oil of international societies, and especially of arrangements for international 
order.”201 These observations are transferable to the state and local level, as legitimacy 
applies to the border institution, “lubricating” relationships between different groups of 
people, as long as the state’s authority is honored. 
The normative component of legitimacy is crucial to understanding group and 
individual perceptions of institutional legitimacy. Beyond feelings, the normative 
foundation of legitimacy—as described earlier as a sense of justice—is also characteristic 
of a deeply held belief. According to English international relations theorist Martin 
Wight, legitimacy is “briefly described as moral acceptability,” albeit “an elusive and 
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nebulous notion, on the frontiers of morality and law.”202 This vague or “nebulous 
notion” of legitimacy can be accounted for in the diverse definitions catalogued by 
various disciplines and within each specialty that claims to appreciate the role of 
legitimacy. Wight also attaches normative and legal components to his definition of 
legitimacy. German-born American political philosopher Eric Voegelin also suggests a 
concept of obedience to authority in relation to legality and questions of rightness. 
Specifically, Voegelin thoughtfully considers the difference between “belief in the 
normativity and the legitimacy of commands” as two reasons for obedience that are not 
necessarily equivalent.203 Voegelin’s assumption is that “a command can be deemed 
legitimate and at the same time mandate something that, in the opinion of the obeying 
parties, should not happen.”204 Furthermore, “the legitimacy of a command might appear 
very dubious to its recipient, even though he approves of its content.”205 This internal 
tension within authority is a source of instability to the institution as well as to the social 
and political order if not reconciled peacefully. 
2. Systemizing of Legitimacy 
Stillman provides his own answer to Rousseau’s question about state legitimacy. 
“A government is legitimate,” asserts Stillman, “if and only if the results of governmental 
output are compatible with the value pattern of the society.”206 Two important aspects of 
this definition relate to this thesis. First, there is the notion that legitimacy is linked to 
“government output.” As Stillman observes, this is “not only the promulgated laws but 
any action of the government that has an effect on the society.” Second, Stillman sets 
forth the idea of “the value pattern of the society,” which is based on “eight Lasswellean 
values” from Harold Lasswell’s 1950 study Power and Society.207 Departing from 
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Stillman’s overt use of Lasswell’s work, this thesis prefers a meaning of “the value 
pattern of the society” as synonymous with a society’s cultural context.  
The society’s cultural context is also represented by the “community,” which 
embodies the relationships and collective will of the people that consent to an authority. 
Explaining the legitimate sources of authority in society, American sociologist Robert A. 
Nisbet is particularly helpful in augmenting Stillman in this regard. “Authority,” argues 
Nisbet, “is legitimate when it proceeds from the customs and traditions of a people, when 
it is formed by innumerable links in a chain that begins with the family, rises through 
community and class, and culminates in the large society.”208 A person’s relationship 
within the community to the state is a central theme in much of Nisbet’s work.209 For 
Nisbet, authority is “rooted in statuses, functions, and allegiances which are the 
components of any association,” which “is indeed indistinguishable from 
organization.”210 Moreover, Nisbet suggests that “authority not undergirded by the sense 
of recognized function is notoriously tenuous.”211 In other words, legitimate authority 
ascends from deep within society but also from a verifiable function within that society. 
Agreeing with Alexis de Tocqueville and Lord Acton, Nisbet emphasizes that “authority 
must be closely united to objectives and functions.”212 Otherwise, the authority of that 
institution would not only be fragile but also dependent merely on power.213 
With respect to the Ferghana Valley, the “the value pattern of the society” comes 
into contact with state-supported border hardening. Stillman argues that government 
action is not just about the “output itself,” but its “results” and “impacts.”214 The impacts 
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of border hardening on the local population are central to understanding how perceptions 
of legitimacy in the borderlands either undermine or support political and social stability. 
British international relations scholar Chris Rumford notes that “local cultures in border 
regions are important in the sense that borders are places where the people interface with 
the state.”215 Rumford further argues that “the state imposes itself upon a territory and its 
population, whose cultural values and local activities may give legitimacy to the border 
or, alternatively, may erode that legitimacy.”216 The value pattern of the local 
populations within the Ferghana Valley includes a culture formed over centuries without 
a significant sense of nationalized borders. The results of state action are then perceived 
through the local culture and its values. 
The legitimacy of unilateral border hardening along the Uzbekistan—Kyrgyzstan 
border is rooted in the results and impacts of the border hardening. Stillman also holds 
that impacts of “government output” must be “compatible with” social values or 
otherwise cause tension.217 Therefore, illegitimacy can result in institutional instability 
when government policy and social values—which Stillman emphatically extends to the 
values of groups and individuals218—contradict one another. Stillman distinguishes 
between traditional definitions of legitimacy and his formulation, repeating his 
observation that value patterns include what amount to group or individual 
perceptions.219 The question then becomes “defining legitimacy” in accordance “with 
which group (or individual or source) decides whether a government is legitimate.”220 
While this is a valid criticism of concentrating on findings below the state-level in an 
analysis of social value patterns, this thesis avoids the ambiguity of “which group?” 
because the specific focus is on the borderland people in relation to the legitimacy of the 
border institution. Stillman focused on studying the society at large and answering 
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Rousseau’s question related to the legitimacy of the government as a whole. This thesis, 
however, maintains that group or individual perceptions at the local borderlands are 
relevant, while conceding with Stillman the absence of any final arbiter of the accuracy 
of rival group perceptions.221 Philosophical questions related to the accuracy and 
objectivity of perceptions or the universality of norms—while related to legitimacy—are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Further worth is found in Stillman’s expanded definition of legitimacy. Clarifying 
even further, Stillman asserts, “legitimacy is the compatibility of the results of 
governmental output with the value patterns of the relevant systems.”222 This definition 
systematizes and objectifies legitimacy rather than making it a tool of public opinion or 
an indicator of public feeling.223 The purpose of gathering perceptions of the border’s 
legitimacy—instead of considering these views as mere opinions or feelings—is to find 
within these historical narratives a system of social values. Similarly, German 
constructivist Friedrich Kratochwil suggests that legitimacy is “not dealing with the 
coincidence of personal preferences.”224 This systemization of values suggests that there 
is also a systemization of perceptions of legitimacy. By this value system, the governed 
weigh government action and assess its legitimacy. 
Returning to the idea of a value system, Stillman recognizes that a state has many 
such systems, at different levels, with often-contradictory values. Stillman also assumes 
that “legitimacy is always a matter of degree,” but he asserts that “legitimacy is 
nonetheless a desirable property from the point of view of both the government and the 
society” because it reduces state and social costs of interaction when legitimacy is 
high.225 Conversely, when legitimacy is low, either governance and social costs are high 
or the institution loses support. 
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Most scholarly literature on perceptions of legitimacy focuses directly on the state 
or the authority of individual leaders; similar conclusions about institutional stability, 
however, can be drawn concerning borders. Perceptions of legitimacy are a crucial 
variable for institutional stability, whether by preserving, maintaining, or undermining 
the authority of the institution to promulgate and enforce rules. American social 
psychologists John T. Jost and Brenda Major contend that “one of the ultimate sources of 
the state’s legitimacy, which underlies [the] citizen’s implicit consent to its demands, is 
the extent to which the state reflects the identity and meets the needs and interests of its 
citizens.”226 While this conclusion is similar to evaluating the performance of the border, 
consent is linked with higher perceptions of identity and social norms.  
As Jost and Major assert, “it is now a well-established fact in sociology and 
political science that leaders and authorities are effective to the extent that they are 
perceived as having legitimate authority and acting in accordance with prevailing norms 
of appropriate conduct.”227 Furthermore, Jost and Major hypothesize that “the converse 
also seems to be true: when states and leaders are perceived to be illegitimate, their power 
begins to erode very quickly in the absence of physical force.”228 In other words, when 
people perceive an institution’s rules as acting in accordance with their social and cultural 
norms, less physical force (i.e., coercive force through illegitimate methods of 
enforcement) is needed to garner support. “The maintenance of legitimacy, once a state 
has been established and is running its normal course,” suggest Jost and Major, “depends 
primarily on the perception that certain mechanisms for legitimate rule exist, that they are 
intact, and that they are being used as necessary.”229 Political institutions must not only 
factor perceptions of legitimacy into early policy decisions but also continue to assess the 
impact of the rules on the population’s perceptions in order to maintain support. 
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3. Legitimacy and Stability Related to Policy 
Policymakers and scholars alike are increasingly recognizing the relevance of 
legitimacy to the promotion of peace and stability. Practical research that supports sound 
policy bridges the gap between the academic and policymaking environments. Retired 
Admiral James Stavridis, now the Dean of Tufts University’s Fletcher School, suggests 
that greater insight into legitimacy “might help us to understand many of the security 
threats we see unfolding now in real time—like ISIS, which styles itself an Islamic 
‘State,’ or the illegal annexation of Crimea, or the next break away ‘nation’ carved out of 
a European power.”230 As part of a one million dollar grant awarded by the Carnegie 
Corporation of New York aimed at better understanding the role of legitimacy, the goal 
of the Tufts research is “to develop strategies to enhance the legitimacy of fragile states 
through research and outreach efforts aimed at the media and policymakers.”231 
Specifically, the program investigated the “indicators for state legitimacy across four 
sectors: political, economic, justice and security.”232 The study is unique because it 
focuses on legitimacy concerning these four elements of society and encourages 
understanding about legitimacy among policymakers and the media. Concluding after 
two years, the study published five research papers, eight policy briefs, and two 
occasional papers that addressed concepts of legitimacy and aimed to inform policy. 
The study concisely defined “political legitimacy as popular acceptance of a 
governing authority’s right to exercise that authority.”233 This definition again 
emphasizes authority and right as two primary elements of legitimacy, as well as 
identifying who is judging the legitimacy (popular acceptance) of the governing regime. 
Consistent with this definition, the study’s final Policy Brief identified three elements of 
political legitimacy. Beginning with the nature of legitimacy itself, the authors of the 
study described “legitimacy as a subjective concept, meaning it is about perceptions and 
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beliefs, not objective, normative standards that apply universally.”234 The questions 
pertain to “whether governing authorities are perceived to be worthy of support; not 
whether they satisfy some pre-determined set of criteria.235 While Stillman represents an 
attempt to objectify legitimacy, this thesis adopts the subjective concept of legitimacy 
advanced by the authors of the Tufts study. Additionally, legitimacy is concerned with 
support for the governing authority and whether those governed approve of the authority.  
The second element of legitimacy “puts the focus on internal perceptions of 
legitimacy — whether and to what extent those who are subject to authority believe it to 
be legitimate.”236 Not only are perceptions the bellwether for gauging support, but also 
the emphasis is on identifying the support of the internal population over elite or foreign 
perceptions of the government’s legitimacy. Stillman recognized that one challenging 
aspect of subjective legitimacy was determining whose perceptions mattered. Another 
challenge to analyzing legitimacy is determining to what degree legitimacy matters. 
British scholar Dominik Zaum argues that “a state’s legitimacy is not a question of 
degree, but is inherently contested, as the social norms and shared interests against which 
different social groups judge these legitimacy claims are likely to differ.”237 This thesis 
suggests that legitimacy is both a matter of degree (i.e., how much support there is for the 
governing authority) as well as a matter of relative legitimacy among differing (although 
not always competing) social groups. 
Finally, the third element of legitimacy from the Tufts study contends that 
analysis should extend beyond the “state institutions at the national level” because “local 
levels of governance and non-state actors may also accrue legitimacy.”238 Perceptively, 
the study indicates that “the various levels of authority may compete for legitimacy in the 
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eyes of a population, or they may be mutually reinforcing.”239 Institutions creating rules 
and constructing order are at every level, including above and below the state. These 
institutions can be associated with a government or independent of a government; they 
may also be secular or religious in orientation. When analyzing the border institution in 
the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan borderlands, one challenge is identifying how local 
perceptions may not only be different between various groups, but also blend institutions 
across a single frame. If a person is speaking about the injustice of the border post or the 
customs agent, he may be driven also by a lack of meaningful work or education for his 
children. In other words, perceptions of border legitimacy are not formed in a vacuum but 
are influenced by perceptions of the worthiness of other institutions. 
4. Legitimacy and Local Perceptions 
Local perceptions of legitimacy are relevant to borders because if the local people 
believe that only open borders are legitimate, obedience to hardened borders requires 
enforcement through coercion. In other words, obedience or compliance is almost 
exclusively an issue for hardened borders, whereas open borders demand less or nearly 
nothing from people crossing. Similarly, any political institution that demands a specific 
action or conformity to a certain order requires either obedience or compliance. While 
willing obedience is achieved through legitimate authority, which causes people to 
acknowledge the authority as right, forceful coercion gains compliance through force and 
illegitimate methods. 
Belief in a border’s legitimacy increases obedience from those observing the 
border’s demands. People, therefore, are more likely to disregard or disobey the border if 
the state loses its capacity to enforce the commands or in places and scenarios where the 
enforcement through coercion is weakened. Accordingly, the stability of the border 
institution would be undermined, also diminishing the border’s ability to achieve one of 
its goals: security against non-traditional threats, such as drug smuggling, human 
trafficking, or international terrorism. The central value of local perceptions of the border 
is to legitimize the authority of the border institution, thereby increasing obedience 
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without force and diminishing the need for coercive methods of compliance. Over 
dependence on the use of force to gain compliance thus drags the border into a circular 
process of undermining the border’s legitimacy, increasing the need for coercive state 
enforcement along the border, and perpetuating the perception of the border as 
illegitimate. 
Borders are political institutions that command the obedience or compliance of 
people. Making rules implies a certain amount of institutional authority. Central to any 
rule making is the imposition of will upon the agent. The border institution commands 
obedience or compliance with its rules, described here as the border structure of its 
commands, restrictions, and taxes, and (among other impacts) the modification of the 
geopolitical space.  
Border making is also a complex term that needs defining. Perceptions about 
border legitimacy usually include narratives of how the border was drawn, constructed, 
and reinforced. Some confusion might arise from different disciplines defining border 
making as a formal state act, an informal process, or the accumulated consequence of 
exchanges over centuries. Border making is defined here as the state production of 
international borders, through either the moving or redrawing of existing borders or the 
construction of entirely new borders. Hardening is a formal process of border making, 
albeit not always necessary. 
Border making also includes informal processes that involve changing social, 
cultural, and geographic factors. Historian Sabri Ateş demonstrates both formal and 
informal border making with his account of the Ottoman–Iranian border, a process of 
formation that occurred over centuries.240 Considering boundary construction from the 
periphery of the borderland rather than from a state-centric perspective, historian Peter 
Sahlins recounts “invention of a national boundary line and the making of Frenchmen 
and Spaniards” in a history of Pyrenees communities.241 One of the purposes of such a 
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historical account of a border is to understand the “relative ‘fossilization’” of some 
borders, as opposed to the deliberate drawing or construction of a specific boundary or 
otherwise contentious border at other places.242 
Since border making is a multi-disciplinary and multi-stage process, the 
responsibility of delineation and demarcation often defaults to specialists of various 
border commissions who act in support of a nation’s interests. Geographers and 
cartographers are just some of the types of professionals involved in border making; 
others might include members of the military, political and diplomatic representatives, 
lawyers, state bureaucrats, and local or regional representatives.  
Beyond acts that materialize or rematerialize, borders can also be opened or 
erased entirely. This process might have profound impacts on the perceptions of 
borderland groups, depending on potential claims over sovereignty that may conflict. The 
open borders of the Schengen Area are examples of the opening-up of borders, but events 
like the destruction of the Berlin War in 1989 are even more dramatic examples of the 
removal of a political border that not only became a social and economic border, but also 
symbolized the Cold War for nearly three decades (1961–1989).  
Since borders manage flows of people and goods, their opening or disappearing 
has significant cultural, social, economic, and political consequences. Another form of 
the opening of borders is selective management, illustrated with passport regimes or other 
forms of traveler identification restrictions that allow only certain individuals or groups to 
pass, while simultaneously limiting the movement of others. Whether made, changed, 
opened, erased, or selectively managed, borders deeply impact how people of that 
territory and outsiders see the geopolitical space. Even with a border changing or 
disappearing, Israeli political geographer David Newman suggests that borders do not 
“disappear altogether,” but leave behind a residue that might continue to influence how 
people perceive the territory in the future.243 Asking, “Borders for whom?” and the 
related question, “who benefits and who loses from enclosing, or being enclosed by 
                                                 
242 Sahlins, Boundaries, 2. 
243 Newman, “On Borders and Power,” 23. 
 68
others?,”244 Newman links border making with state authority to enact, institutionalize, 
and change rules.  
C. BORDER HARDENING 
This section elaborates on the definition and characteristics of border hardening, 
links the concept of legitimacy with hardening, and considers stability in light of the 
hardening process. 
1. Defining Border Hardening 
What is border hardening? While some borders function as a bridge to other 
communities, the conventional view and function of borders have been defensive, 
primarily as a barrier or filter. More recently, borders have been securitized and 
criminalized not for traditional defensive purposes but to counter non-traditional security 
threats such as terrorism, transnational crime, and cross-border smuggling of people, 
weapons, and drugs.245 Border hardening and demarcation efforts are central to these 
border changes and directly affect the political, cultural, and socio-economic dynamics of 
the border region. 
Reece Jones argues that border hardening, one of the most visible markers that 
define a border, was legitimized because of security concerns in the post-9/11 global 
environment.246 Elisabeth Vallet refers to the speed at which global walls and fences 
were built following 9/11, suggesting “a latent tendency that predated” post-9/11 calls to 
protect against globalized terrorism.247 Multiple experts argue that the purpose of these 
new physical markers is not to defend against a military threat, but rather to guard against 
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migrants, refugees, terrorists, and illegal cross-border traffickers and criminals.248 While 
border hardening is not a new international phenomenon and there is no single reason 
behind it, there is a story that explains how it became a de facto norm for many 
international borders. State border policies are also a form of planning by political elites, 
and border hardening is no exception. As Roger Scruton argues, “Central planning by the 
state is likely to be insensitive to local perceptions, and biased in favor of the areas where 
politicians tend to live.”249 In other words, state policies often disadvantage those living 
at the periphery, far from the capital, and along the borders. 
The term border hardening describes an institutional process, while the phrase 
hardened borders is descriptive of both the nature and type of the border. Hardening is 
also referred to as “thickening, toughening, and tightening,” all representations of a 
border process that increased dramatically following the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the United States.250 Recent scholarly research on the hardening of U.S. 
borders with Mexico and Canada has contributed to insights about both state practices to 
harden and the effects of hardening on local and regional levels. In his well-regarded 
Border Games: Policing the U.S.–Mexico Divide, Peter Andreas describes the “growing 
use of new surveillance and information technologies,” as manifesting “virtual borders,” 
while “extending border controls outward” represents the “‘thickening’ of borders.”251 
Andreas includes additional border enforcement tactics in his description of hardening, 
including the expansion of security buffer-zones, road checkpoints, policing efforts, and 
border crossing related arrests.252 
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Border hardening is usually a response to state security concerns. Described 
earlier as a deliberate policy of the state, the aims of border hardening include addressing 
international security concerns commonly accepted as threats against regional stability. 
Border hardening is also part of normalizing and “fixing” international borders. This 
norm maintains that political boundaries require delineation and demarcation when 
unclear. Border hardening is more than a physical process that materializes the border, 
but a deeply social, economic, and cultural process that affects people’s attitudes about 
themselves and their perceptions of the state.253 The physical materialization of a border 
as a barrier—specifically, through fences, walls, and checkpoints—is also expensive and 
resource demanding.254 
The hardening of a border is frequently in tension with other state-related 
concerns. While hardened borders restrict illegal traffic and trade, this type of border is 
also an impediment to legal trade crossing the border. Additionally, hardened borders 
favor elites—political and economic—because they have greater access to means of 
securing legal passage or bribing their way across a border. Furthermore, hardened 
borders also favor state-owned or large businesses rather than locally owned businesses. 
Hardened borders also have a considerable effect on the local populations, influencing 
local perceptions of the border.255 
2. Between Legitimacy and Hardening 
German sociologist Alena Pfoser provides a case study of border making from the 
“bottom-up,” demonstrating the value of this approach through the “understanding of [a 
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border’s] stability and malleability.”256 Using ethnographic research from border towns 
on the periphery of the European Union during a process the author calls “reordering 
Europe,” Pfoser discusses social and economic interpretations of hardening borders in 
relation to historical memories of individuals, from “privileging local concerns for 
mobility or adopting the state’s concerns over security and sovereignty.”257 Comparing 
two adjacent towns, one in Estonia and another in Russia, separated by a river, Pfoser 
describes the traumatic experience “when Estonia declared its independence in 1991 and 
successively installed border guards and material fortifications along the border,” 
effectively ending decades of daily social and economic movement.258 “The once 
integrated borderland” under the Soviet Union, declares Pfoser, was “turned into a site of 
divisions and nationalism.”259 Similar descriptions have been made of other post-Soviet 
places, especially in Central Asia.260 
Although focused on borderlands in liberal and post-industrial spaces rather than 
the autocratic and predominantly agrarian Ferghana Valley, Pfoser’s research about the 
border hardening process between communities—previously linked socially, politically, 
and economically—is insightful for this thesis. Pfoser’s conclusions regarding the 
“experience and negotiations of physical borders as ‘sites of mobility and enclosure’”261 
inform the “bottom-up approach to border-making projects,”262 further validating the 
concept that borders mean different things to different people depending on their 
historical experiences and spatial perspective. Her research assumes that “State power is 
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always present at the edges of states,”263 regardless of the role of the central state on the 
borders. Pfoser’s research goes beyond asking why there is a border or how the border 
affects people dwelling in the borderland. In her words, “the main question for them is 
not if there is a border but how is the border—whether it runs counter to or corresponds 
with personal, local, or national needs of security, mobility, and economic well-
being.”264  
Pfoser’s research questions are important to the analysis in this thesis, providing 
the bottom-up framework of inquiry. In what she describes as her “grounded 
examination” of the re-bordering process, Pfoser asks: 
1. How is this border lived and interpreted? 
2. How can we conceptualize citizens’ negotiations of borders and state 
authority in the borderland? 
3. In the face of the increasing bureaucratization of the border, is the state 
merely experienced as a negative and disruptive force in the 
borderland…or do we have to assume a more complex relationship 
between citizens and the state? 
4. What do local perceptions of the border tell us about the tensions at post-
Soviet borders more generally?265 
Pfoser’s two narrative frames for analyzing the border—the everyday life of 
mobility and cross-border activities concerned with the sovereignty and security of the 
state—are useful to understand underlying tensions between state border practices and 
the experiences of the people in the borderland. Furthermore, Pfoser’s emphasis on 
border interpretations and conceptions is not far from evaluating a border based on local 
perceptions and forms of obedience. Pfoser also shows that border perceptions can vary 
dramatically among the multiple scales of territory, from the individual to the local 
community on up through the state and international levels. 
3. Hardening and Stability 
Boaz Atzila cites the works of Charles Tilly and Donald Horowitz, along with 
reviewing the historical development of these concepts, to support his view on the 
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international norm of territorial integrity and fixed borders. Atzila, however, argues 
against the conventional wisdom. He contends that fixing borders through delineation and 
demarcation might undermine international stability, thereby increasing conflict among 
weak states. “Socio-politically,” reasons Atzila, “weak states in a world of fixed borders 
may be more prone to internal conflict or even civil war because the incentives for 
excluding whole groups of citizens are greater, and because there is a higher likelihood of 
the emergence of an internal security dilemma.”266 Atzila discusses conflicts that might 
be exacerbated by bordering through fixing the line: civil-war spillover from another 
state; refugees that “create breeding grounds for insurgency” movements; and imbalances 
created between minority ethnic groups, their ethnic homeland, and the hosting state.267  
Atzila fully accepts Tilly’s argument that war making leads to state making, 
which leads to more effective tax extraction and results in efficient modern states.268 
After testing four hypotheses against multiple case studies, Atzila contends that fixed 
borders weaken already enfeebled states, leading to an increased propensity for 
international conflict. The thesis proposed by Atzila, however, is primarily concerned 
with the international phenomena of territorial integrity and the prospect of international 
conflict. He is relatively silent on border hardening as a phenomenon and its effects on 
regional stability through local perceptions. 
Scholars consider the concept of border fixing at multiple scales of geography. 
Alejandro Grimson describes the process of fixing borders in both regional and local 
contexts. Although his analysis is primarily regional, focusing on the integration between 
states and the effect that fixing borders has on the creation of states, Grimson’s concept 
of “borderization” provides insight into the multiplicity of borders in the Ferghana 
Valley. Borderization “refers to the historical process in which the many elements 
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making up a border are shaped by the interaction of central powers with border 
populations.”269 Borders are never truly fixed, remaining “unfinished and unstable,” 
collectively the “historical outcome of human action.”270 The local element of 
borderization represents three of his “four constitutive elements”: the population living in 
the borderlands, the historical analysis of “different sociocultural regimes in the border 
area,” and the multiple ways that the border is perceived.271 
Grimson’s framing of state borders being fixed also provides the conceptual 
framework to understand how border hardening might materialize through the political, 
cultural, and socio-economic interactions in the borderlands. In Grimson’s view, even 
“such things as trade wars, media disputes and diverse conflicts concerning identity” 
represent tensions and possible conflicts that “are ultimately about the border.”272 These 
observations imply that dramatic changes in the characteristics of a border, especially 
when agrarian lives and communities depend on the products of territories defined by this 
border, might cause instability and increased conflict. 
Normative questions aside, policy debates relating to open or closed borders 
remain unsettled: Do fixed borders make local conflict less frequent? Does the process of 
border hardening increase local tensions and conflict? From contrasting the relatively 
closed external borders of the European Union with its open Schengen zone internal 
borders273 to contrasting local and regional border preferences against international 
norms and expectations, research on the dynamics of border hardening has grown in the 
past two decades—a direct result of increasingly hardened borders.274  
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4. Global Context of Border Hardening 
Since the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, border 
hardening has become a prevalent norm between states on every continent. When 
deliberately undertaken as a policy, border hardening demands a significant investment of 
labor, money, materials, and other state resources. As the trend of more hardened borders 
continues in the twenty-first century, scholars and policy advocates seem less confident 
that international borders could soften.275 Just as the “rise and demise of the territorial 
state” proposed by John Herz at the dawn of the nuclear age went unrealized, 
globalization is unlikely to dissolve borders.276 A wide field of scholarly literature 
addresses the performance and effectiveness of borders, whether hardened or soft, but 
overlooks the impact of hardening on the long-term institutionalization of borders and its 
relationship with regional stability. This thesis analyzes a specific case of border 
hardening in relation to regional stability, border legitimacy, and institutional obedience 
using Max Weber’s framework for institutional authority. 
Depending on the degree to which they are hardened or soft, borders restrict the 
flow of goods and people between states. Specifically, border hardening describes the 
delineation and demarcation of a territorial border through fences or walls, as well as the 
process of the securitization and militarization of a border through unilateral 
enforcement, vigorous patrolling and surveillance, and the criminalization of prohibited 
crossings. Hardened borders are visible and experienced as a part of everyday life 
between the United States and Mexico and between the European Union (EU) and the 
non-EU post-Soviet states, as well as between many borders in the Middle East, Africa, 
and Asia. Political and military leaders often presume that hardening is an easy 
prescription for non-traditional security threats, including international terrorism, 
transnational criminal networks, cross-border smuggling, and illegal migrant or refugee 
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flows. These potential security threats are interwoven, complex problems that relate to 
borders and contribute to local as well as regional instability. It may seem logical, then, to 
assume that the policy response of border hardening improves regional stability. 
Instead, border hardening is commonly associated with enhanced stability in 
regions prone to conflict.277 Borders in Central Asia’s Ferghana Valley—with their 
relatively short history of formation over the last century—are especially suited for 
critically analyzing the assumption that border hardening improves local security and 
regional stability. Along its border with Kyrgyzstan in the Ferghana Valley, Uzbekistan 
unilaterally adopted hardening as a practical means of border enforcement. Uzbekistan 
responded to the 1998 terrorist attacks in the capital city of Tashkent with border 
hardening, among other measures, and diverged from its previous policy of “friendly 
borders” among the post-Soviet Central Asian republics following independence in 1991. 
Uzbekistan’s border hardening efforts intensified in the early 2000s, aided by security 
cooperation assistance programs—in the form of money, training, and materials—from 
the European Union, the Russian Federation, and the United States.278  
Border hardening increased the pressures of everyday life for people living in the 
Ferghana Valley borderlands. As the borders hardened, crossing became a greater 
challenge, especially when compared to the Soviet era or the period immediately 
following independence. For people living in the Ferghana Valley borderlands—
particularly along the Uzbekistan−Kyrgyzstan border—previous patterns of social, 
cultural, and economic interaction rubbed against the increasingly hardened border.  
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This tension with the border that makes everyday life more difficult may also 
undermine the overall social and political stability of the region, despite addressing 
immediate state security concerns. Furthermore, border hardening may change social 
perceptions of the border, diminishing the border’s overall institutional legitimacy. The 
issue then becomes whether border hardening thwarts regional stability through a process 
of decreased border legitimacy and social obedience, despite the presumed success of 
hardening against security threats that otherwise would degrade regional stability. 
Questions related to the Ferghana Valley are admittedly complex and multifaceted, given 
all the border and social dynamics contributing to regional stability. Policy-makers and 
military leaders must move beyond assumptions and simple answers to complex 
challenges in order to balance short and long-term factors of security and stability. 
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IV. FERGHANA VALLEY BORDERS, 1991–2009: HISTORICAL 
CONTEXT FOR BORDER HARDENING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There is a history in all men’s lives. 
—Earl of Warwick, Shakespeare’s Henry IV279 
Recent history of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border and regional security 
concerns of the Ferghana Valley furnish the context for Uzbekistan’s unilateral border 
hardening. Every border has a unique history framed by a particular time, culture, and 
place. Geographer Nick Megoran applies the term “boundary biography” to unpack a 
border’s history and to “explore how specific boundaries materialize, rematerialize, and 
dematerialize in different ways, in different contexts, at different scales, and at different 
times.”280 Just as “good biographies of people illuminate moments of their lives and 
show how these multiple aspects interrelate or contradict each other,”281 a useful 
boundary biography will illustrate the continuities and discontinuities of the Uzbekistan–
Kyrgyzstan border. Borrowing metaphors from the natural sciences, historian John Lewis 
Gaddis describes the discontinuities as “phase transitions” that mark “those points of 
criticality at which stability becomes unstable.”282 Border hardening in the late 1990s is 
one such discontinuity in the Ferghana Valley because it marked a shift, from previously 
porous and open borders of “friendship” to securitized and hardened borders of 
antagonism between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.283  
                                                 
279 William Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part II, Act III, Scene 1, line 1785, from Open Source 
Shakespeare, The George Mason University, http://www.opensourceshakespeare.org/views/plays/
play_view.php?WorkID=henry4p2&Act=3&Scene=1&Scope=scene. 
280 Nick Megoran, “Rethinking the Study of International Boundaries: A Biography of the 
Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Boundary,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 102, no. 2 (2012): 
477, doi:10.1080/00045608.2011.595969. 
281 Ibid., 478. 
282 Gaddis, Landscape of History, 98. 
283 For an explanation of Uzbekistan’s unilateral border hardening from 1999 to 2000, see Megoran, 
“The Critical Geopolitics of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Boundary Dispute, 1999–2000,” 
746–758. 
 80
This thesis concedes to the conventional wisdom that border hardening decreases 
immediate security threats and improves regional stability.284 Specifically, border 
hardening between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan should have increased stability in the 
Ferghana Valley in the late 1990s and early 2000s, especially when considering the 
immense local and national resources committed to hardening the border as well as the 
billions of dollars from foreign states funding this hardening. The reasoning for 
dedicating these resources stems from the idea that border hardening reduces cross-
border illegal activity, fixes an ambiguous and porous border, and increases state security 
against non-traditional threats common to the region such as terrorism and smuggling.  
Before assessing the effects of border hardening on security and stability, this 
chapter explains the history of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border in light of a 
popularized “danger narrative” that shapes international engagement as well as propels 
the persistent security concerns threatening stability in the Ferghana Valley. Chapter II 
reviewed the general explanations of security dynamics in the Ferghana Valley and the 
most compelling explanations for sources of regional instability, as well as relevant 
concepts of border theory and recent literature on border hardening. Building on Chapter 
II, Chapter III first analyzes Western perspectives of the Ferghana Valley in terms of 
“danger narratives.” These danger narratives may hinder more nuanced understandings of 
the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border and the prospects for stability in the Ferghana Valley 
by entangling policy and funding decisions with misconceptions. The second section of 
this chapter expounds on the Ferghana Valley’s history under the Soviet Union and the 
Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border’s internationalization following independence in 1991. 
The third section traces the subsequent hardening of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
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B. “DANGER NARRATIVES” OF THE FERGHANA VALLEY: FUELING 
MISPERCEPTIONS, DRIVING POLICY AND FUNDING 
“Danger narratives” fuel Western misperceptions of the Ferghana Valley, drive 
misguided policy and funding, and ultimately legitimize coercive border enforcement 
along the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border. Madeleine Reeves depicts academic and policy 
discussions on the Ferghana Valley as distorted and “dominated by accounts of Central 
Asia as the battle-ground of elemental forces and a focal point for ‘civilizational 
clash.’”285 Reeves emphasizes that the Ferghana Valley is at the heart of this discourse of 
danger, frequently “identified as the mythical epicenter of such contention.”286 Many 
political and military leaders then associate the Ferghana Valley with these danger 
narratives. John Heathershaw and Nick Megoran suggest that “the way people—
embedded in organizational structures and as individuals—think about certain places 
affects the way they act towards them.”287 Subsequently, misperceptions influence 
Western foreign aid and international conflict prevention programs, security assistance 
policy and funding, media coverage, and scholarly research toward the Ferghana Valley.  
Danger narratives of Central Asia and the Ferghana Valley are rooted in historical 
characterizations that, in particular, are nothing new. Beyond a clichéd portrayal of 
regional volatility, foreigners often levy two additional characterizations upon Central 
Asia: Great Game geopolitics and the Heartland Theory. Originating in the nineteenth 
century, the Great Game first referred to the struggle between Russia and Great Britain 
for control of Central Asia; subsequent references have inferred power struggles between 
the United States, Russia, and China for regional dominance in Central Asia.288 
According to Robert D. Kaplan, the first contemporary use of “heartland” in the 
theoretical sense was by British geographer James Fairgrieve in his 1915 book 
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Geography and World Power.289 The idea of Central Asia as part of the global 
“heartland,” however, goes as far back as Halford J. Mackinder’s 1904 pamphlet “The 
Geographical Pivot of History,” which Mackinder subsequently expanded into the 1919 
book Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction.290 
Mackinder’s theory emphasized Central Asia’s geographic placement among the trifecta 
of the competing and intermingling continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa; this narrative 
is inherently about conflict and furthers the perception that Central Asia is dangerous.  
While the Great Game and Heartland arguments continued as part of Cold War 
geopolitics, the emergence of the oil-rich Gulf and the later destabilization of the 
Afghanistan–Pakistan region further centralized the heartland view of Central Asia in 
Western narratives during the post-Soviet and post-9/11 eras.291 German geographer 
Hermann Kreutzmann also discusses the heartland theory in his essay, “Boundary-
making as a Strategy for Risk Reduction in Conflict-prone Spaces,” theorizing that 
“spaces offering a certain degree of freedom are shrinking” and that, within the 
borderlands of the heartland, “riskscapes and the vulnerability of the inhabitants are 
growing.”292 Kreutzmann’s assessment furthers the perception of the Ferghana Valley 
borders as a significant risk factor, another source of danger. With borders now among 
the potential sources of instability in the Ferghana Valley following the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, the Heartland thesis and Great Game motif continue with renewed 
emphasis, escalating the impression of conflict between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and 
the potential for a wider war. 
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Despite widespread—albeit, cautious—optimism for peaceful relations between 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan during the initial years of independence,293 the Central Asian 
danger narrative reasserted itself in the late-1990s, and it has continued more than 
twenty-five years after independence.294 The newly internationalized and ambiguous 
borders of post-Soviet Central Asia increasingly became a dominant concern driving the 
danger narrative.295 A 2003 RAND report commissioned by the United States Army 
described the Soviet manipulation of borders as a lasting legacy: “The Ferghana Valley’s 
heritage as the political and cultural center of Islam in Central Asia was what led Stalin to 
divide it among the three states [Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan] with its present 
convoluted borders, ensuring control from Moscow by a divide-and-conquer 
mechanism.” This same report also suggested that, across Central Asia, “border conflicts 
are most likely in the Ferghana Valley.”296 British author and journalist Edward Stourton 
made a similar assertion in 2010, arguing, “The way Stalin designed the region ensured 
that it would regularly be shaken by inter-ethnic violence.”297 Stalin, according to these 
interpretations of the region’s demarcation history, set forth a policy to limit the 
economic and social influence of the Ferghana Valley by dividing its political influence. 
While more nuanced than the pejorative explanations of “Stalin’s Giant Pencil”298 or 
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lines drawn by a “drunkard,”299 these explanations continue the danger narrative, 
perpetuate the belief that future conflict in the Ferghana Valley is nearly inevitable 
because of “Stalin’s time bombs,”300 and misguide conflict resolution and border 
management programs. 
Alarm based on the danger narrative attracts foreign money and resources that 
offer mediation programs and conflict resolution services. Following the 11 September 
2001 terror attacks on the United States, increased concern with security and terrorism 
spurred much of the funding for academic research related to the Ferghana Valley.301 
Meanwhile, border disputes and violent local conflicts, ostensibly about ethnic divisions 
created by supposedly haphazard borders, dominated Western news reporting on the 
Valley.302 When violence or local conflict occurs in the Ferghana Valley, faulty 
assumptions about the borders preclude more meaningful conversations that consider the 
role of contingency and individual agency.  
Furthermore, the international political environment falsely equates ill-defined or 
undemarcated borders with conflict. With growing international terrorism and 
transnational criminal organizations in the 1990s and 2000s, the securitization and 
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criminalization of the US–Mexico border also informs broader perceptions that open or 
porous borders are a threat to stability. The perceptions that harder borders are more 
secure not only guides academic research in security studies but also influences some 
U.S. foreign policy decision-makers and designers of international security assistance 
programs to support more coercive border management regimes.303 The problem with 
relying on danger narratives, argue Heathershaw and Megoran, “is not simply that it leads 
to academic and journalistic misinterpretations of events in the region but that it informs 
and, therefore, deforms western policy and practice.”304 The popular danger narratives of 
the Ferghana Valley fuel assumptions that border demarcation and border security 
professionalization are proper responses to avoid future conflict. As Madeleine Reeves 
notes, “accounts of peace and conflict potential in the region nonetheless regularly cite 
the ambiguity of territorial borders and the presence of minority populations in 
neighbouring states as ‘root causes’ of conflict in the region, typically joining water 
shortages, unemployment, corruption and Islamic militancy as other key conflict-
inducing factors.”305 The U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office produced a report 
as recently as 2016 entitled Undemarcated Borders of Violent Conflict in Central Asia 
that weighs the dangers of border disputes and the prospects for future security in the 
region.306 Reeves suggests that “undemarcated borders being discursively transformed 
into ‘unresolved border disputes’” is one indication of this danger discourse on the 
Ferghana Valley.307  
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The point here is that undemarcated or undelineated borders are not necessarily 
sources of conflict in and of themselves. As Starr notes, border conflicts and violence 
between ethnic communities “have given rise to the notion that the Ferghana Valley is 
fundamentally unstable.”308 Starr surmises that too much of the scholarly literature and 
news reports “regard the various explosions of instability as intimately linked with one 
another causally and arising from supposedly age-old ethnic hostilities across the 
Ferghana territory.”309 Additionally, the projection of Western concepts—including 
territorial alignment, sovereignty, and national congruence—is partly responsible for 
widespread assumptions that such ambiguity or openness about borders and identity leads 
to conflict. Also, political and military leaders fail to consider the actual roots of conflict 
when they assume that the Ferghana Valley borders derived from a dangerous drunkard’s 
pencil. A deeper understanding of the Ferghana Valley without mistaken assumptions—
including its historical context—is needed among policy-makers, especially concerning 
the formation of its borders and the effect that hardening borders has on the social, 
economic, and cultural dynamics of the region.  
The danger narrative of the Ferghana Valley—perpetuated by distorted media 
reporting, agenda-driven scholarly research, and misplaced international aid—impedes an 
accurate understanding of the complexity of the region. Writing from a historian’s 
perspective, Starr criticizes this distorted view of the Ferghana Valley. “The image is one 
of a zone of crisis,” notes Starr, “with a generalized state of turmoil lying just beneath the 
surface which can at any time burst into the light of day.”310 Whether interpreting 
incidents of conflict in light of border disputes, nationalism, terrorism, ethnicity, or 
“specific governmental policies,” the all too common shortcoming in Ferghana Valley 
scholarship is failing “to consider these various incidents in any kind of broader 
context.”311 In fact, experts employing a multidisciplinary approach—including with 
                                                 





geography, economics, history, sociology, and political science methods—have 
accomplished recent scholarship on the Ferghana Valley based on a “broader context.” 
Several political geographers and ethnographers have dedicated their professional 
careers to explaining the Ferghana Valley more accurately to outsiders. Nick Megoran 
and John Heathershaw unpack “the received wisdom of Western policy,
 
journalistic and 
entertainment communities as well as much of the academic world of area studies that 
Central Asia is a source and site of particular dangers,” and explain that danger narratives 
risk becoming, at worst, self-fulfilling prophesies, while at a minimum, directing millions 
of dollars of international aid toward faulty programs.312 The insights of Megoran and 
Heathershaw, along with those of many other researchers who have spent time in the 
borderlands before border hardening and since, provide needed nuances to the border 
stories in the Ferghana Valley. Clearly, gaining an accurate understanding of the 
Ferghana Valley “is no simple matter, for to do so demands an understanding of very 
diverse aspects of human activity, including economics, social relations, politics, culture, 
religion, and a myriad of sub-elements within each of these spheres.”313 As noted by 
Starr in Chapter II, the Ferghana Valley is not simple.314 Beyond understanding security 
and stability in the Ferghana Valley, border demarcation and hardening efforts are also 
part of a larger international debate on the merits of sovereign borders (discussed earlier 
in Chapters II and III). Since monetary assistance and security training from foreign 
governments and international organizations continue to support border security projects 
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for Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan,315 the effects of border hardening efforts need to be 
more accurately understood. 
C. BORDER-MAKING AND INTERNATIONALIZATION: HISTORICAL 
CONTEXT FOR THE FERGHANA VALLEY 
This section provides the historical context for the making of the Uzbekistan–
Kyrgyzstan border during the Soviet era and explains the unique internationalization of 
these borders following independence. No other area in Central Asia more vividly 
represents the complexity of post-Soviet spaces than the Ferghana Valley’s intersection 
of international borders among Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Maps of the 
Ferghana Valley indicating different demarcations remain as much political or 
ideological statements as the results of cartography. As the result of the region’s 
history—pre-Russian, Tsarist, and during the Soviet era—Nick Megoran describes how 
the materialization of borders between communities changed identities even in the short-
term. While conducting ethnographic fieldwork in the region’s border areas, his efforts to 
bring “some order and demarcate Uzbek and Kyrgyz, Uzbekistani and Kyrgyzstani” 
amused his hosts.316 The local reply suggested that “here, no one talks about Uzbekistan 
or Kyrgyzstan.”317 These nationalized descriptions were foreign concepts to the people 
of the Ferghana Valley borderlands. Despite whether such designations mattered to 
locals, historic ambivalence about nationalized labels is antithetical to modern state 
bureaucracies and border management practices. Contextualization of the Uzbekistan–
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Kyrgyzstan border begins with its history of formation, internationalization, and eventual 
hardening.  
Two political processes transformed the Ferghana Valley over the last century—
domination under Moscow during the greater part of the twentieth century and overnight 
political independence that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union. While the 
Ferghana Valley has a long history, “conquered and settled by numerous different groups, 
from Greeks and Arabs to Mongols and Turks,”318 the period under Soviet rule and 
independence from the Soviet Union provide the dominant context for contemporary 
political social, economic, and cultural dynamics in the Ferghana Valley. Additionally, 
the border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan was created, “materialized, 
dematerialized, and rematerialized” through these processes and Uzbekistan’s subsequent 
border hardening.319 The global shift toward securitizing borders and criminalizing 
certain border-related activities—although accelerated in the wake of 9/11 and the United 
States-led invasion of Afghanistan—was underway between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
by 1998. The temporal focus of this thesis is on border hardening in the late 1990s 
through the early 2000s, concluding before the 2010 violence in Osh, Kyrgyzstan. The 
Ferghana Valley, however, is contextualized through its broader history, including the 
formation of socialist states under the Soviet Union, followed by the challenges of 
statehood since independence.  
1. Border Making Under the Soviet Union. 
The danger narrative centered on borders is too simplistic, ignoring the strategic 
calculations of Stalin’s cartographers at the time of the Soviet territorial delimitation, as 
well as the influential involvement of locals in the border-making projects during the 
1920s. A more nuanced and accurate understanding of Central Asian border-making is 
needed to avoid the danger narrative, particularly as it relates to the idea of dangerous 
borders, and to assess stability in the Ferghana Valley. A common narrative regarding the 
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conception of Central Asia’s contemporary borders usually begins, “The drawing of 
borders between republics from 1924 by Stalin was highly arbitrary…the communists 
engineered new and arguably artificial regional units..”320 Rather than the result of 
conflict, the administrative borders delineating Soviet republics in the Ferghana Valley 
derived in part from Moscow’s decisions from the 1920s through the 1960s.321  
Research since the end of the Cold War has produced a more nuanced 
understanding of early Soviet border making, especially for the Central Asian borders. 
Sally Cummings distinguishes different scholarly theories for Soviet border delimitation 
in the Ferghana Valley—including to divide ethnic populations, to advance “economic 
imperatives” of the state, to provide some form of equality among republics, to serve as 
temporary constructions pending a future international system, or more simply to reflect 
ethnonational lines—noting that the full answer is probably a combination of these 
reasons.322 According to some Soviet archival evidence, Cummings argues, “the picture 
we have of border drawing is less one of an arbitrary process than one that also involved 
Soviet ethnographers, local cultural and political elites and wider populations.”323 The 
dependence of the Soviet delimitation process between 1924 and 1936 along ethno-
linguistic divisions led to the “four Soviet Socialist Republics of Uzbeks, Tajiks, 
Turkmen, and Kirghizia.”324 Since delimitation, these borders of former Soviet republics 
have changed little, even after their 1991 independence, reflecting congruence in 
national-territorial alignment for nearly a century. 
The politicization of the Ferghana Valley territory occurred during the early years 
of the Soviet Union. Above all, efforts of Soviet ethnographers, Moscow and local 
bureaucrats, and cartographers were based on a pure scientism that intended to rationally 
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construct nations in order to carryout an eventual communist internationalism.325 “The 
national-territorial delimitation (NTD) that took place between 1924 and 1936,” explains 
Reaves, was “a singularly important moment in Central Asia’s recent history that also 
marked the triumph of a particular normative conception of territorialized nationhood, 
which still lives on in Central Asia today.”326 
The historical context illuminates, however, how quickly the political and 
practical significance of these borders changed. In less than a century, the Ferghana 
Valley borders went from demonstrating relative political unity across the Valley to more 
or less delineating three independent republics. The Soviet Union was instrumental in 
creating the ethnically aligned states and delineating borders, while, at the same time, 
creating a common space among the Soviet socialist republics. Political and economic 
independence in 1991 was accompanied by “consolidating new statehood and civic 
identities, while allowing for the growth of national cultures that were formally 
developed but also oppressed.”327 Additionally, multiple ethnic enclaves—holdovers 
from administrative deals under Moscow—continue to exist outside their ethnically 
centered countries in the territories of other states.328 While political borders are the 
primary concern in this analysis of history in the Ferghana Valley, it is difficult to 
separate the political dimension fully from the social, economic, and cultural dimensions 
of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border. As Cummings acknowledges, “political borders, 
like their geographic and cultural counterparts, have changed in their reach and in the 
degree to which they have created clearly identifiable and fixed loci of power.”329 The 
borders and borderlands of the Ferghana Valley demonstrate this changing nature and 
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meaning of political boundaries through time, as well as the changing assertiveness of 
Uzbekistan’s central government on the borderlands.  
Relevant archival sources remain closed to researchers, either by local autocratic 
regimes or by Moscow, preventing a full historical account of the Central Asian border 
making. As described in the danger narratives, most observers contend that Central 
Asia’s contemporary border issues are rooted in the region’s subjugation under Tsarist 
Russia and the Soviet Union.330 Attributing contemporary border issues in the Ferghana 
Valley to Moscow’s legacy in Central Asia is not entirely unfounded. Central Asian 
borders stem chiefly from the political, economic, and social decisions made by Tsarist 
Imperial and Soviet Communist leaders during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Where no state borders had previously existed, Moscow established the Central 
Asian borders in less than a century. Also, as Cummings noted, “local practices and 
beliefs” greatly influenced the early border making process, which further complicated 
the local perceptions and the practical effects of the Ferghana Valley borders.331 One 
reason for continued disagreements over border delineation among the republics in 
Central Asia is a lack of consistency with the original maps. Acclaimed French 
geographer Yves Lacoste argued that “clear and evocative...historical maps which make 
it possible to understand the development of the situation (through successive 
borderlines)” are necessary for insight into a nation’s claim over contested territory, 
particularly when such a claim is historical.332 Such “clear and evocative” maps remain 
elusive, or at least the historical maps held as evidence for different territorial claims are 
contradictory. As a result of the disputed histories of the Ferghana Valley borders and the 
multitude of conflicting maps produced under the auspices of the Soviet Union, it is 
difficult to resolve contradictory claims for territory by relying on the maps alone.  
While historical uncertainty may be exaggerated as a direct source of 
contemporary conflict, the Soviet legacy does play a prominent role in the biographies of 
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the Ferghana Valley borders. “The Soviet project,” acknowledged Cummings, “while 
also retaining pragmatism and realpolitik, was nevertheless shaped by the ideological and 
deliberately transformative project, communism, and this set at least three new meanings 
for political borders of the region.”333 Cummings describes two meanings that are 
directly pertinent to the Ferghana Valley’s borders.334 First, Central Asia was absorbed 
into “the Soviet whole,” setting the region apart from the capitalist world as distinctly 
socialist, and separating it further from the rest of “the wider Muslim world.”335 Second, 
Central Asia’s “delimitation created five of the 15 Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs), 
each of them bearing the titular name of the five Central Asian ethno-linguistic groups 
identified by the Soviet authorities and ethnographers.”336 Along with the five new 
SSRs, the new borders acquired new meanings. Borders in the Ferghana Valley, 
especially, “were given ethno-linguistic content…with all their contradictions.”337 These 
historical contradictions are evident not only in inconsistent maps produced during the 
Soviet era that failed to clarify the delineation of borders between the individual 
republics, but also in the concept of pan-Sovietism that increased interdependence 
between the borderland peoples. For example, shared use of water management 
infrastructure, roads, pasture and farming lands, as well as postal and education systems 
under the Soviets nonetheless eventually led to painful separations and divisions after 
independence.  
Newfound political independence in 1991 challenged longstanding presumptions 
of political and economic unity in the Ferghana Valley. Megoran highlights this 
characteristic of unity within the general history of the Ferghana Valley, stating that, 
“although it has been subject to a large number of successive rulers, the Ferghana Valley 
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has been under the control of a single political entity for much of its history.”338 The 
Ferghana Valley’s economy is also highly interdependent; for one, agricultural lowlands 
in Uzbekistan depend on the westward flow of water, while hillside communities in 
Kyrgyzstan rely on the lowlands to graze livestock. Independence from the Soviet Union 
meant local leaders needed to confront not only considerable ideological and political 
questions, but also practical economic challenges. While the original Soviet delineation 
plan built on the “largely pragmatic” rule of the Russians under the Tsar,339 the ethno-
linguistic border divisions were never intended to solidify into permanent and 
independent states.  
2. Independence and the Internationalizing of the Uzbekistan–
Kyrgyzstan Border. 
The Ferghana Valley’s borders were internationalized nearly overnight.340 The 
borderlands between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were transformed into a space where 
state power and control could define who was “in” and who was “out.” British 
international law scholar Rein Mullerson suggests that these internationalized borders are 
themselves sources of conflict between newly independent states.341 As the Soviet Union 
peacefully disintegrated, all aspects of life were affected: administrative borders were 
upgraded to international borders, and political relationships between communities across 
borders were officially severed, while economic and social connections remained largely 
intact but fragile. The process of border internationalization was not a source of conflict 
in and of itself, but, combined with border hardening, it established a tension between 
political, economic, social, and cultural dynamics and state institutionalizing of the 
border. 
According to Cummings, the general “reluctance to declare independence” in 
1991 was the result of dual transformations of both the state bureaucracy and society 
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under Soviet tutelage, which left local leaders fearful of a future outside the socialist 
union.342 For the Central Asian republics, identity and statehood were intrinsically linked 
with the ideology of socialism and the history of the Soviet Union.343 In fact, the collapse 
of the Soviet Union from within resulted in the “creation of independent statehood by 
default.”344 Cummings further identifies the effects of late state formation: “many of the 
processes that elsewhere took centuries to achieve have been accelerated”345 in Central 
Asia to dramatic effect. The people of Central Asia were “forced to come to terms 
simultaneously with a number of transformative, contradictory processes.”346 Sudden 
independence from Moscow necessitated simultaneous processes of nation- and state-
building. 
While the Ferghana Valley borders were not the only areas requiring demarcation 
within Central Asia, a complex set of political, cultural, and socio-economic dynamics 
drew specific attention to this valley’s borders and its potential for conflict. As a result of 
the elevation of borders to international status at the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
republics of Central Asia suddenly needed to address the challenges pertaining to border 
control and management. State capacity for border management, however, was minimal 
in the newly formed republics because no such need had existed under the political and 
territorial unity of the Soviet Union. The lack of inherited border regimes in Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan and the slow bureaucratic institutionalization of the borders in the 1990s 
also coincided with international optimism about globalization, which encouraged 
national leaders to reassure populations that the borders would remain friendly. 
Advocates of a democratic “end of history” and open borders thought border hardening 
was a thing of the past. Uzbekistan’s de facto international borders remained 
administrative in character throughout much of the early 1990s.  
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The five Central Asian states, along with their borders, assumed international 
status nearly overnight when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.347 In the immediate 
aftermath of Central Asia’s independence, Graham Fuller observed that “huge questions 
about the future nature of relations among the old republics have yet to be worked out—a 
process that will probably take years.”348 Fuller’s 1992 assessment followed multiple 
trips to Central Asia and Moscow between the summer of 1991 and May 1992. As 
described in his report sponsored by the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Fuller 
met with “numerous opposition groups and figures, Russians working in Central Asia, 
intellectuals, journalists, and an Islamic religious figure”349 over the course of his 
multiple trips. With unusual access to prominent people in the former Communist bloc, 
Fuller also was “afforded personal interviews with the president and vice-president of 
Uzbekistan, the president of Kazakhstan, [and] a senior advisor to the president of 
Kazakhstan.”350 These multiple trips and Fuller’s analysis over more than a year brought 
him into contact with people living in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Moscow. 
Fuller’s pragmatic judgment that clarifying relations between Central Asian states would 
“probably take years” understated the challenge. After more than twenty-five years, there 
is still no clear sense of the “future nature of relations” between these sovereign states.  
Moscow’s control of Central Asia through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
promoted cooperation across state borders, including cross-border trade, coordinated 
infrastructure projects, common currency, and even shared ideology. Moscow was often 
called upon to mediate disputes between rival political and economic interests in the 
Central Asian states.351 The period of Soviet control was another phase in a long series 
of outsiders controlling Central Asia, particularly in the Ferghana Valley. “Although it 
has been subject to a large number of successive rulers,” notes Nick Megoran, “the 
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Ferghana Valley has been under the control of a single political entity for much of its 
history.”352 Certainly, the Soviet chapter of the Ferghana Valley’s history would leave its 
mark: the effects of years of Stalinism, decades of Soviet-forced social reconfiguration, 
the suppression of religious practice, and communist economic experimentation did not 
evaporate in the summer heat of 1992 and the first year of independence. As Eric 
McGlinchey notes, the Soviet legacy has led to chaos in Kyrgyzstan and violence in 
Uzbekistan.353 With Tajikistan embroiled in a civil war during the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan were left to dominate the future landscape of the Ferghana Valley.  
Beyond geography, the historical and political context is also important for 
understanding how people relate to their space. Reeves develops several perspectives that 
are specific to the post-Soviet territory of the Ferghana Valley, in light of a collective 
memory and contemporary challenges. Observers should consider, suggests Reeves, “the 
social and infrastructural connections of the past,” especially “the spatial imaginaries” 
that populations in the Ferghana Valley maintain, “to make sense of the pain and pathos 
of gaining and losing citizenship.”354 This “pain and pathos” applies particularly to 
ethnic Uzbeks living in Kyrgyzstan but who maintain familial and cultural relationships 
across the border in Uzbekistan. Reeves describes the contemporary political and social 
landscape as a “radically variegated post-Soviet world of documentary privilege, where 
the color of one’s passport can make a profound difference to your chance of getting out 
and getting on.”355 Recalling a “phrase commonly used to explain the (imagined) 
mobility of the past, murdagy bir ele passport bolchu (“in the past there was just one 
passport”),” Reeves illustrates that some are at least nostalgic for aspects of the mobility 
and freedom offered by Soviet borders.356 It is necessary not to reduce “such claims to 
mere nostalgia or the politics of regret,” contends Reeves. Such a reductionism would 
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“ignore to the degree to which the Soviet Union was felt to incorporate, connect, and 
provide channels of mobility.”357 
The legacy of the Russian and Soviet-era control over Central Asia remains a 
factor on the economic dimension of the Ferghana Valley, as does the effect of the 
sudden change in the economic dimension of the borders between the three states in the 
Ferghana Valley. Sally Cummings describes how the states were “forced to come to 
terms simultaneously with a number of transformative, contradictory processes.”358 From 
the leaders to the rural population, independence transformed inter-state relationships and 
borderland dynamics. The initial spirit of cooperation did not last. Cummings describes 
how “an interstate system of payments has not been created, no mechanism for the 
resolution of disputes exists, and no efficient mode of compensation from gainers to 
losers has been formulated.”359 In the realms of their economy and security, Central 
Asian states “failed to co-operate,”360 instead choosing paths of “national 
protectionism.”361 As the border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan hardened in 
response to terrorism and security concerns, historical norms concerning the people, their 
work, and their territory also changed in the borderlands.362 Borders became more than a 
cartographer’s two-dimensional mark. They became strong points of control and 
negotiation for the new states, as depicted in Figure 2.  
The regimes in Central Asia agreed for the most part to maintain the status quo of 
their borders after independence “with the exception of some unilateral border 
demarcation by the Uzbek regime.”363 The borders of Uzbekistan remained relatively 
open, “apart from a brief crisis in 1993 when President Karimov closed Uzbekistan’s 
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border with Kyrgyzstan to prevent Russian roubles flooding the Valley, in response to 
Kyrgyzstan’s exit from the rouble zone as it introduced its own currency.”364  
Uzbekistan’s historical context strengthened a sense of national identity apart 
from its neighbors. Even though Uzbekistan was still a relatively young nation-state, 
Uzbek history became central to national government appeals after independence. 
Graham Fuller noted in his 1992 RAND study on Central Asia that “Uzbekistan has a 
strong sense of national identity and the national self-confidence that comes with 
numbers, size, and historical importance in the region.”365 The connection of people to 
their homeland, layered with a sense of national identity, is strong when tied to their 
ancestors. The groundwork for this national identity and a sense of an Uzbek homeland 
were building even before independence, as expressed in 1973 by Uzbek poet Cholgan 
Ergash: 
So that my generation would comprehend the Homeland’s worth, 
Men were always transformed to dust, it seems. 
The Homeland is the remains of our forefathers 
Who turned into dust for this precious soil.366 
Expounding on these poetic lines that revere the “Homeland’s worth,” Robert Lewis 
insists “the sense of a primordial connection between nationalist and homeland is said to 
be as strong as that between nationalist and ancestors.”367 The national identity noted 
earlier by Fuller has been strong throughout Uzbek history, but independence brought 
new urgency for the state to define its population apart from other nationalities. This 
formation of Uzbek national and local narratives had a direct effect on the meaning of 
borders in the Ferghana Valley.368 Although the importance of borders grew after 
independence in 1991, particularly for the national political elites, most borderland 
people paid little attention until the central government institutionalized the border with 
signs, fences, and checkpoints.  
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Understanding the government’s perspective and the effects of independence 
casts some light on the development of Uzbekistan’s border policy during the 1990s. 
Uzbekistan was initially preoccupied with the development of its bureaucracy and its 
post-Soviet reforms. Independence was more than a theoretical problem; it was a real 
challenge for the state to govern its people and territory. As Cummings observes, “when 
Soviet power imploded in 1991, these five separate Soviet republics were to become, 
almost seamlessly, the five independent states, providing both continuity (same political 
borders) and change (different political meaning).”369 No longer united by socialism 
through Moscow, the Central Asian republics, in effect, embarked on new programs of 
state and institution building, while maintaining their former bureaucracies and their 
inherited borders. An article entitled “Achievements of Political Reforms,” posted by the 
Embassy of Uzbekistan to the United States, describes the initial transition from Soviet 
rule as “the first stage of state building, from 1991 to 2000.”370 Just as the Uzbeks in the 
borderland were confronted with new realities about the borders, so too were officials in 
Tashkent confronted with the realities of the country’s institutions and practical questions 
relating to its currency, time zone, postal system, and agricultural irrigation (since some 
of the system’s mechanical pumps were located across the Kyrgyz border). According to 
an official Uzbek government history, “This was an era of immediate and essential 
reforms and transitional changes, which contributed to the development of the national 
statehood.”371  
As state capacity grew, the state interests and power also expanded toward its 
borders. Then President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan outlined the threats to security and 
future prospects for his country in his 1998 book, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the 
Twenty-first Century: Challenges to Stability and Progress. Whether he actually wrote all 
or some of it, this book marked the closing of a discussion about democratic reforms and 
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the opening of the late-1990s narrative over “threats to security.”372 This book also 
offered an important perspective on official—or at least elite—views on the security 
threats facing Uzbekistan and the regional prospects for stability. Organized in two parts, 
“Threats to security” and “Conditions of stability and guarantees for progress,” President 
Karimov presented his vision for Uzbekistan on the verge of the twenty-first century. 
Karimov acknowledged that “Uzbekistan is encircled by countries burdened with ethnic, 
demographic, economic and other problems,” in addition to “such hotbeds of instability 
in the region as Afghanistan” and a post-civil war Tajikistan.373  
Two primary questions established the agenda for Karimov’s quasi-official book 
on Uzbekistan’s security and future prospects for stability: “What does national security 
in its broadest sense imply for Uzbekistan? What is our vision of this security?”374 
Karimov then asserted his idea of “national security” for Uzbekistan, including “the basic 
principles of the indivisibility of security, that security implies a permanent process and 
has no limits.”375 Karimov’s second assertion summarized his perspective on threats to 
Uzbekistan’s national security. Specifically, Karimov argued that “Ethnic, regional and 
local conflicts and aggressive separatism in states cause the main threat to universal 
security.” While Karimov recognized that this type of conflict “turns out to be a powerful 
instrument of political influence in the hands of some states, which seek to maintain and 
protect their own interests and zones of influence or to change the strategic balance of 
power in their favor,”376 he argued that ethnic conflicts and “aggressive separatism” are 
both internally and externally driven threats. For Karimov, security and regional stability 
are clearly connected.  
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Karimov also asserted the state’s absolute prerogative for ensuring political, 
social, and economic stability through the elements of security. Karimov further 
reiterated that the primary “threats to security” of Uzbekistan and the region are “such 
phenomena as political extremism, including religion, nationalism and national self-
isolation, contradictions of an ethnic, interethnic, local and tribal nature, corruption and 
criminality, and ecological problems.”377 These security challenges are not only 
interrelated but also dependent on the condition of state borders. As Karimov recognized, 
local conflict—including the civil war in Tajikistan and the fractious fighting in 
Afghanistan—spreads across political borders, effecting regional stability.378 Karimov 
elaborated on what he considered to be a regional problem regarding “the border 
transparency between the Central Asian states,” especially in terms of the ongoing 
“guerrilla war” in Afghanistan.379 Specific threats included “armed militants” and “spill-
over.” Writing at least three years prior to the United States-led invasion of Afghanistan 
in October 2001, Karimov already perceived porous borders as a threat to national 
security. With the changes in official Uzbek concerns and deepened global concerns over 
terrorism following 9/11, borders became even more important as instruments of state 
power and security.  
Different identities are frequently in tension within borderland spaces. 
Geographer Péter Balogh describes a dichotomy between the identity formed by the 
nation and that of the diversity common around most borderlands. “The border of a 
country can be a site where displays of nationalism are intensified to consolidate the 
territorial state,” explains Balogh, while borderlands are also “zones of cultural overlap 
where the national identity and loyalties of the people often become blurred.”380 Balogh 
derived many of his observations from research on the historically fluid German–Polish 
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borderlands. Such historically contextualized and fluid identities of people in borderlands 
deeply affect the local attitudes about loyalty and the local perceptions of the state. 
When Megoran began collecting his field observations in 1995, the Uzbek and 
Kyrgyz people along the borders maintained fluid identities as opposed to a strict sense of 
national Uzbek or Kyrgyz citizenship. According to Megoran, “this liminal space where 
nation, territory and state were not coterminous rendered nation–state building programs 
artificial, even absurd.”381 In the immediate aftermath of independence in 1991, the 
borders of the Ferghana Valley were “porous, and its social geography dynamically 
interconnected.”382 For the Uzbek capital of Tashkent, control of the borders was not the 
immediate concern when almost everything else—political and economic—needed to be 
redefined from the previous Soviet era.  
While ethnic tensions and inter-communal conflicts occurred between Uzbeks and 
Kyrgyz before 1991 and through the early 1990s, borders were of little consequence until 
the Uzbek state could actually muster the capacity to control the borders. A process of 
border hardening, described by Megoran in his account of field experiences between 
1995 and 2000, consisted of “the ominous construction of a new Uzbekistani customs 
post, a visit by boundary cartographers, and the recent exclusion of non-citizens from the 
Uzbekistani school which had forced the local Kyrgyzstani school to admit Uzbek 
children and open Uzbek-language classes.”383 The construction of a border management 
regime in Ferghana Valley accelerated toward the end of the 1990s, especially in 1999 
when Uzbekistan enacted a series of border controls to limit cross-border movement in 
areas that were “previously porous.”384  
These examples of a nation literally building up the physical meaning of the 
borders between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan show the effects on the borderland people, 
much as the strengthening of national identities through nationalism increases the sense 
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of the “other,” the “foreigner,” and “them.” As Tashkent affirmed its “political 
geographic order on such communities,”385 the tensions within the borderlands also grew 
between local people. A typical narrative from pundits attributes conflict simply to ethnic 
divisions, but the borderlands are far more complicated than this one-dimensional view of 
ethnicity as the “defining drama of a Valley.”386 While the political aspects of the state 
also emphasize the ethnic dimensions of local conflict, and increasingly the religious 
dimension, these narratives must be analyzed in conjunction with the social and 
economic dimensions of life in the Ferghana Valley.  
D. CHRONOLOGY OF UZBEKISTAN–KYRGYZSTAN BORDER 
HARDENING 
Borders in the Ferghana Valley are unique because of their relative newness, as 
well as their agency in creating and distinguishing national identities during the Soviet 
era and post-Soviet independence. The Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border evolved from 
1991 to 2009 through the process of border hardening efforts that included walls and 
fences, limited crossing points, restrictive visa regimes, and increased patrols by military 
and police forces.387 The borderlands became a zone of securitization and 
criminalization. State and international efforts to increase stability in the Ferghana Valley 
focused on the demarcation and securitization of borders under a global norm for fixed 
borders and within the context of transnational security threats, such as terrorism and 
drug smuggling. The hardening of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border is considered by 
Uzbek officials and foreign interventionists as an important element of regional conflict 
prevention, consistent with global border demarcation and “fixing” efforts as well as 
security programs to counter international terrorism.388  
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Prior to hardening, the newly internalized borders in the Ferghana Valley were 
considered open. Consistent with largely “administrative and rather symbolic” Soviet 
borders,389 several national leaders in Central Asia actually confirmed their intentions to 
maintain open and friendly borders upon independence in 1991.390 Megoran illustrates 
the persistence of the social, economic, and cultural relationships in the Ferghana 
Valley’s post-Soviet borders during the early years of the 1990s: 
Border and customs posts were established, but control checks were 
minimal or non-existent and daily cross-border life in the Valley continued 
almost uninterrupted. Social and familial cross-border links were very 
strong. Weddings continued to bridge the republican border, great convoys 
of cars and buses transporting dowries and guests. Border-area shrines 
(such as that located only meters from the boundary in Uzbekistan’s 
border town of Rishton, Solomon’s Mount in the heart O’sh city, and the 
Sahoba shrine outside the Kyrgyzstani town of Eski-Nookat) continued to 
precipitate significant flows of pilgrims at set seasons. Soviet-era bus 
routes persisted, and the economic crisis pushed many professionally (42) 
skilled people to utilize them in cross-border trade.391 
Megoran’s observations of the internationalized Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border infers 
continued freedom, despite state understanding that their political statuses had changed. 
Notably, the new status of the border did not restrict the mobility of citizens (Uzbek or 
Kyrgyz) on either side of the border. The relationship patterns described by Megoran 
were not the result of years or even decades, but often formed through generations of 
interaction within the Ferghana Valley. Megoran notes that even when control points 
materialized along the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border, these “control checks were 
minimal and easily evaded.”392 Cross-border relationships were central to everyday life 
before independence from the Soviet Union, a pattern that did not cease following 
internationalization. 
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However gradual, the new statehood was changing not only the political structure, 
but the social and economic order in the Ferghana Valley through a “trick down affect” 
from differences materialized quickly at the national level. These differences soon 
affected the sense of difference in meaningful ways at the local level. Megoran describes 
how “the two republics slowly ‘drifted apart’ as they became increasingly differentiated 
in tangible ways.”393 These substantial national differences included a stark contrast in 
the political regimes, with Uzbekistan’s “authoritarianism that differentiated it from the 
relatively freer regime in Kyrgyzstan;” the pursuit of “separate currencies” and differing 
styles of economy, with Uzbekistan maintaining the vestiges of its Soviet past and 
Kyrgyzstan aggressively “breaking-up of collectives and a greater diversification into 
cash crops such as tobacco;” and preference for the national languages (at least for 
official business) over the lingua franca of Russian.394 Beyond creating immediate 
difficulties and marking the differences between territories, the new borders also affected 
shared opportunities for the future. For one, cross border educational exchanges 
decreased between research universities and schools that had previously attracted 
students from throughout the Ferghana Valley either limited students from outside the 
state by the mid-1990s or did away with quotas for Ferghana Valley foreigners 
altogether.395 The more dramatic changes occurring at the state level eventually reached 
the borderlands, affecting the lives of its population and changed their sense of identity in 
some cases.  
Most scholars identify a shift in Uzbekistan’s border policies following the 1999 
Tashkent bombings, in which the government implicated Islamic terrorists based in 
Kyrgyzstan.396 “The conscious experience” following independence, in fact, “crept upon 
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the inhabitants of the Valley more slowly.”397 Megoran argues that it was not “until the 
events of 1999–2000”398 that the people of the Ferghana Valley borderlands realized 
their full differences, for better or worse, depending on whether they were an Uzbek 
living in Kyrgyzstan, Kygyz living in Uzbekistan, or an Uzbek or Kyrgyz living in their 
respective ethnic homeland.399 
The primary threat to state authority, as articulated by the Uzbekistan 
government, consisted of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) strongholds in the 
Ferghana Valley during the late 1990s and early 2000s.400 The IMU based itself in the 
Ferghana Valley as well as the Afghanistan borderlands, taking advantage of cross-border 
movement into Uzbekistan from safe havens in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Afghanistan.401 Along with other events implicating either terrorists or separatists, 
Uzbekistan instituted a series of unilateral border hardening initiatives beginning in the 
late 1990s.402  
Following the 1999 bombings in Tashkent, Uzbekistan initiated patrols along its 
borders and implemented a new visa regime limiting cross-border interactions. Figure 3 
illustrates the sporadic fields of mines and fences placed along the border between 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. “The boundary enforcement measures, both military and 
administrative, introduced by Uzbekistan from 1999 onwards,” observes Nick Megoran, 
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Syria-the Transformation of Central Asian Radical Islam,” Eurasia Outlook in Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 25 July 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/25/from-fergana-valley-to-syria-
transformation-of-central-asian-radical-islam. 
402 See Megoran, “The Borders of Eternal Friendship?.” 
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“were principally justified in terms of protecting the economic and military security of 
the state.”403 
 
Figure 3.  Border Fence in the Ferghana Valley.404 
Construction of the first border fence by Uzbekistan began in 1999. Restrictions to cross-
border travel followed, affecting more than 2.5 million Uzbeks living beyond its borders 
in neighboring countries.405 Since the bombings in 1999 and the 2001 invasion of 
Afghanistan by a U.S.-led coalition, miles of fences and checkpoints have been 
established along the Uzbekistan – Kyrgyzstan border.406 Uzbekistan justified these 
initial border hardening policies and practices as necessary for reasons of security and 
national sovereignty.  
                                                 
403 Nick Megoran, Gaël Raballand, and Jerome Bouyjou, “Performance, Representation and the 
Economics of Border Control in Uzbekistan,” Geopolitics 10, no. 4 (2005): 726, doi: 10.1080/
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404 Source: UNEP, “Ferghana Valley: Population groups,” United Nations, http://reliefweb.int/sites/
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406 See Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, ed., Border Disputes: A Global Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara, CA: 
ABC-CLIO, 2015), in chapter by Isabella Damiani, “Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Uzbekistan: Ferghana Valley,” 
330–333, and chapter by Timur Dadabaev “Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan: The Sokh Enclave,” 335–344. 
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Changes to everyday life were dramatic following Uzbekistan’s initial hardening of 
the border. The numbers of “border guards and customs officers” were increased, “new 
control posts were built and existing facilities upgraded, and in many places crossings were 
closed, roads dug up, and bridges demolished.”407 Megoran recalls how several roads 
between Kyrgyzstan towns that were locally depended upon were severed by Uzbekistan’s 
implementation of its borders. The fact that Uzbekistan could sever roads that were of 
strategic value to the livelihoods of Kyrgyz resident in Kyrgyzstan illustrates the level of 
interdependency in the Ferghana Valley’s infrastructure, as well as the complexity of 
borders affecting the various enclaves and exclaves. Along with the border hardening was a 
thickening that extended beyond the immediate borderline. Thickening occurs when the 
securitization of the border extends inward or outward—not necessarily defined by 
kilometers or districts—to the extent that more inhabitants than ever before experience the 
enforcement of the border. Megoran explains that “a concomitant ‘securitization’…of 
internal oblast borders and a reorganized policing and control of movement and transport 
within the country matched” the hardening of the borders.408 
Local frustrations with the unilateral border hardening soon followed its 
implementation, as the effects on everyday life were aggravated by inconsistent 
regulations and a general lack of certainty about the future. “In spite of the employment 
of this range of technologies and techniques of control,” observes Megoran, “the ‘border 
regime’ was far from uniform or predictable.”409 The policies flowing from Uzbekistan’s 
capital of Tashkent were not uniform, changed regularly, and were also influenced by the 
local elites that sought personal advantage in the new border institutionalization. During 
his ethnographic research, Megoran personally experienced “ever-changing regulations” 
that “seemed to apply to pedestrians, buses, trucks and private cars over time and 
between crossing points” in different ways at different times.410 Application of these 
regulations was also not uniform along the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border, with some 
                                                 
407 Megoran, “The Borders of Eternal Friendship?,” 46. 
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410 Megoran, “The Borders of Eternal Friendship?,” 47. 
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points identified locally “as being easier or harder to pass.”411 All of these newly felt 
controls of hardening, implemented in a seemingly haphazard manner, “compounded the 
uncertainty,” which played into the “proliferation of rumors about the introduction of visa 
regimes, tariffs on traffic, and even complete closures of the border.”412 Despite 
ineffective implementation at times, the hardening of the border and the changes in 
access were real for the people in the Ferghana Valley borderlands. Uncertainty about the 
future course of their lives—so dependent on cross-border relationships—and the 
perception of the border’s arbitrary implementation created feelings ranging from mere 
annoyance to a readiness to commit outright acts of resistance. Resistance to the new 
border rules was sometimes as simple as smuggling food and clothing across the border 
to friends and shadow markets, but it also included cutting through the new fences and 
antagonizing the border guards. 
The border hardening began in earnest as early as January 1999, increased 
following the February 1999 car bombings in Tashkent, and reached even more dramatic 
proportions in August 1999 with the Batken terrorism crisis across the border in 
Kyrgyzstan. With the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) already implicated in the 
violence in Tashkent, this “group of dissident Islamist guerrillas headed by Ferghana 
Valley exiles linked to militant Islamist groups in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, invaded 
Kyrgyzstan’s southern regions of Batken and Chong-Alay from Tajikistan.”413 The 
porous Tajikistan–Kyrgyzstan border allowed the IMU to mount this attack with little 
opposition from Kyrgyzstan’s military or security forces. The IMU attackers returned to 
“the mountains of Tajikistan by November” 1999, when “Uzbek jets mistakenly bombed 
the Kyrgyz village of Kara-Teyt as claims and counter-claims flew” between officials 
from both states and local residents.414 The Batken events in late 1999 solidified earlier 
efforts to harden the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border with the addition of a “two-meter 
high barbed wire fence around large sections of the Ferghana Valley border” and 
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numerous minefields (identified in Figure 3). Karimov officially instituted strict visa 
regimes for the borders in March 2000. The strategy was that “new border and customs 
posts,” along with “troops of young conscript soldiers from both” Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan “posted to patrol this vast area of mountain and pasture” land would “prevent 
future incursions.”415 Reeves states that “by 2005, the region was peaceful but over 
determined by a discourse of securitization and the need for a ‘strong, secure border.’”416 
The state was no longer a distant concept for residents of the Ferghana Valley. Rather, 
the border institution was strongly felt on both sides of the boundary through its 
restrictive rules and physical materialization. Border hardening in 1999 and early 2000 
effectively ended centuries of freedom of movement throughout the Ferghana Valley.417 
There is one post-script to the events of 1999, identified by Megoran, with regard 
to the sequence of events that sheds light on the complexities of nationality and loyalty in 
the Ferghana Valley. A closer examination of the events leading up to the border 
hardening suggests that there were state motives beyond simply countering terrorism and 
improving security. As noted earlier, the official Uzbekistan announcement of the first 
border hardening acts in January 1999 included an economic justification, but this 
reasoning was quickly eclipsed by security concerns. The official state narrative 
presented in Karimov’s writings and some local accounts are, ultimately, not consistent 
with the actual chronology of the hardening. In fact, the initial efforts began prior to the 
Tashkent bombings in February 1999. Megoran explains that not only had border 
hardening begun prior to the Tashkent bombings, but that the memory of these events 
was distorted and incorrect among many locals.418 
Nationalism and the rapid formation of national identities following independence 
offer some explanation for this reversal of events in the local memory. More specifically, 
ethnic Uzbeks living in Kyrgyzstan have navigated complex fields of loyalties between 
their territorial state (Kyrgyzstan) and their national identity as ethnically Uzbek. 
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Contrasting the local memories of ethnic Uzbeks living in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, with factual 
events of the border hardening, Megoran concludes that memories have been mythologized 
with these competing loyalties by referring to some of American geographer Morgan Liu’s 
observations while conducting research in the Ferghana Valley. Especially important for 
ethnic Uzbeks was their “sense of place in the political landscape,” notes Megoran, 
“primarily with regard to their relations of allegiance to legitimate authority embodied in 
particular figures.”419 Drawing from the ethnographic observations by Liu, Megoran 
suggests that ethnic Uzbek elders remained primarily loyal to Uzbekistan’s President 
Karimov, who represented “a figure in the classical Uzbek khan ideal,” rather than the state 
authority of their actual citizenship in Kyrgyzstan.420 This mythologizing about Karimov 
by elders resulted in a refusal, deduces Liu, “to criticize his closure of the border, even 
though it brings harm upon themselves.”421 As Megoran recalls, Lui’s “informants 
justified the closure as a struggle against terrorism, reworking the sequence of events into a 
popular meta-narrative of a decisive Karimov taking necessary crisis measures.”422 
Megoran is critical, however, of Liu’s strong conclusions in so far as they simplify the 
complexity of identities for Uzbeks living in Kyrgyzstan.  
The underlying relevance for this thesis, when studying borders and differences 
between groups, is to understand that identities not only matter but also are not 
homogenous. The complex web of ethnic, tribal, national state, and familial loyalties 
cannot be reduced to simple bi-directional lines that connect a person to a sense of 
authority. Attitudes about loyalty, respect for authorities, perceptions of winners and 
losers in border hardening, and perceptions about the legitimacy of the border are as 
complex as the multitude of identities in contention in the Ferghana Valley. 
  
                                                 





V. LEGITIMACY AND LOCAL PERCEPTIONS: AN 
ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING BORDER 
HARDENING AND STABILITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter IV contextualized the Ferghana Valley borders with the contemporary 
“danger narrative,” the history of regional border making, and the basic chronology for 
the hardening of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border, while also drawing inferences about 
local perceptions of legitimacy as a result of the border hardening process. Chapter V 
builds on this understanding of the Ferghana Valley borders to propose a theory and 
framework that underscore the concept of institutional legitimacy during the border 
hardening process. Building on the scholarly research discussed in Chapters II and III—
including the relevant concepts in border studies, the process of border hardening, and the 
basics of institutional legitimacy—this thesis now examines the effects of border 
hardening on regional stability, moving beyond the standard security analysis. 
From the Great Wall of China to Hadrian’s Wall in Great Britain, fortified 
political borders have long served to protect populations from perceived external security 
threats while capturing the imaginations of local and foreign populations alike. Hardened 
political borders are often symbolized in popular culture far beyond their original 
functional purpose. One example of this profusion of borders in culture is the Cold War’s 
Berlin Wall, where art depicts various meanings of this border during its enforcement and 
since its collapse.423 From literature to genres of music and film, local and foreign artists 
express their own perceptions about “the good, the bad, and the ugly” of hardened 
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borders to convey stories to their audiences.424 President John F. Kennedy’s “Ich bin ein 
Berliner” speech in 1963 and President Ronald Reagan’s challenge to General Secretary 
Mikhail Gorbachev to “tear down this Wall” in 1987 were powerful political as well as 
cultural statements during the Cold War.425 The Berlin Wall is also an example of 
hardened borders galvanizing strong emotions and perceptions.  
Local perceptions of a border are not only an inspiration for the arts but also a 
health indicator of the relationship between state institutions and a governed populace. 
More specifically, a border institution depends on either willing obedience to a state 
authority or coercion by the state as a means of obtaining compliance. Perceptions of 
border legitimacy influence the extent to which individuals comply with border rules. 
Methods of border hardening are nearly always regarded as illegitimate and coercive in 
nature. When those methods affect the local population adversely, they weaken 
institutional legitimacy. Hardened borders are designed, constructed, fortified, and 
maintained for the purposes of securing, protecting, blocking, restricting, or ultimately, in 
some way, managing the flow of people and material moving between two sovereign 
states. As shown in Chapter IV, perceptions of legitimacy either reinforce or weaken 
social obedience concerning a border, thereby bolstering or undermining the hardened 
border’s original purpose of securing or protecting against outside threats.  
What makes people regard or accept the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border as 
legitimate? How does Uzbekistan’s unilateral border hardening affect this perception of 
legitimacy? Beyond the standard wisdom that border hardening adequately addresses 
certain state security threats, the original research question stands out: How has border 
hardening affected regional stability in the Ferghana Valley? Considered together, these 
questions are sociological and philosophical in nature, related to concepts of authority, 
power, and perception, as well as social agency and individual action.  
                                                 
424 For a description of the good, the bad, and the ugly of borders, see John Agnew, “Balkan Borders: 
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,” Queen’s University Belfast and UCLA, 2012, https://www.qub.ac.uk/
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This thesis contends that the concept of institutional legitimacy should play a role 
in questions related to the hardening and fortification of political borders, notably with 
respect to regional stability. This thesis also argues that increased institutional legitimacy 
of a border will likely increase social obedience, which will consequently reinforce the 
legitimacy of other state institutions while strengthening regional stability. If logically 
valid and sound, the inverse of this proposition should also then be true: when 
institutional legitimacy decreases—manifested through negative perceptions of the 
border—then obedience is undermined, decreasing observance of the border, which then 
leads authorities to undertake additional border hardening to address not only security 
concerns but illegal border crossings.  
For this reason, the undermining of the border’s institutional legitimacy weakens 
the prospects for regional stability. When caught in such an escalating pattern of border 
hardening, the state’s original policy intent—to counter security threats—adversely 
affects the local population. In other words, security concerns drive border hardening, 
which negatively affects the local population and its perceptions and thus weakens the 
legitimacy of the border. Bruce Gilley concludes convincingly that “a legitimate state is 
less dominating over its citizens because the legitimate use of power minimizes the 
negative consequences of power.”426 Similarly, a legitimate border institution is not only 
less restrictive but empowering socially, economically, and politically. When the border 
is perceived as illegitimate, the weakening of border legitimacy leads to instability in the 
border and an undermining of regional stability. 
This thesis proposes a conceptual framework to analyze border hardening and 
regional stability through changing local perceptions of institutional legitimacy. Chapter 
IV provided a brief synopsis of local perceptions and attitudes toward the border. This 
thesis now considers the theoretical framework for conceptualizing local perceptions in 
relation to institutional legitimacy, security, and regional stability. The relevant 
components of border studies and the sociology of legitimacy are considered in relation 
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to the basic assumptions proposed in Chapter I that emphasize the theoretical connections 
among local perceptions, institutional legitimacy, and stability.  
B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section considers the logical premises that are crucial for understanding the 
relationship between local perceptions and institutional legitimacy. Drawn from theories 
of institutional legitimacy and social action theory, these statements condition the 
methodological framework used to evaluate how hardening affects border legitimacy and 
regional stability. 
1. Returning to the Premises: A Border Perspective of Institutional 
Legitimacy 
The primary theory of this thesis posits that hardening of the Uzbekistan–
Kyrgyzstan border undermined regional stability in the Ferghana Valley by changing 
social perceptions of the border’s institutional authority, weakening subjective forms of 
institutional legitimacy, and diminishing social obedience to the border. This theory is 
based on six premises introduced in Chapter I and depicted in Figure 4. These premises 
are the building blocks for the methodological framework applied to the Uzbekistan–
Kyrgyzstan border when analyzing the effect of border hardening on legitimacy. 
 
Figure 4.  Six Premises: Building Blocks of Border Legitimacy. 
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The first premise described in Figure 4 is that borders are institutions constructed 
through political, economic, and social processes rather than simply natural monuments 
to irrelevant histories. Political borders, in other words, have historical biographies that 
describe how they were formed and within what context.  
The second premise is that states intend their border rules—including crossing at 
designated points, following specific identification or visa procedures, and paying 
customs taxes—will be observed by the various agents who encounter the border. Agents 
are individuals at the local, state, and regional levels, including those within the regime’s 
bureaucracy, among the political and social elites, and of the local population. Although 
all three categories of agents are important to border legitimacy, this thesis focuses on the 
perceptions of the local population because they are arguably the agents most 
immediately affected by the hardening of political borders.  
The third premise parallels the point about state intention and affirms that agents 
observe borders under at least two conditions: willing obedience, associated with 
subjective legitimacy, or coercive compliance, gained through the use of force and 
incentives. These two methods are rarely, if ever, employed separately but are usually 
applied in some mutually supportive combination. Strong indications of obedience 
without coercive forms of compliance would suggest higher institutional legitimacy for 
the border. Likewise, when the state is highly dependent on coercive methods and the 
border rules contradict local understandings of a reasonable border, local perceptions of 
the legitimacy of the border are weakened.  
The fourth premise proposes that agent observation of the border grounded in 
enforced compliance is less reliable than that derived from willing obedience. According 
to Bruce Gilley, “legitimacy best explains citizen compliance with state policies.”427 
Meanwhile, “the opposite is also true: illegitimacy is the best explanation of citizen 
unwillingness to obey.”428 While compliance is obtained from coercive state 
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enforcement, willing obedience is sustained by institutional legitimacy and positive 
perceptions of authority.  
Similarly, the fifth premise builds on Weber’s insight that rational-legal 
legitimacy is more stable than other forms of legitimacy. This premise contends that a 
border with strong institutional legitimacy, indicated through willing obedience and 
positive local perceptions of the border, is more stable than a border that is merely 
complied with and enforced by illegitimate forms of state coercion. Local perceptions of 
that border as just and right indicate a strong sense of institutional legitimacy, while 
antagonistic attitudes and perceptions of injustice imply a weak sense of institutional 
legitimacy. Perceptions of legitimacy are stronger reasons to obey than mere compliance 
through the use of force and incentives.  
Finally, the sixth premise holds that high reliance on illegitimate forms of state 
coercion, particularly through the use of force and incentives, actually undermines the 
stability of the border. Illegitimate forms of coercion decrease institutional legitimacy and 
weaken the ability of the border to protect against non-traditional security threats such as 
terrorism.  
2. Border Hardening, Legitimacy, and the Logic of Escalation 
Depending on a region’s historical context, hardening efforts at the border may 
escalate disproportionately to the security threats posed to the state, and ultimately 
undermine regional stability. The six premises in Figure 4 form the logic for the 
interaction among local perceptions, institutional legitimacy, security, and regional 
stability. When states depend primarily on coercive border hardening techniques for the 
enforcement of a historically open and porous border, local populations may grow 
antagonistic toward the border institution. People are more reluctant to obey rules 
willingly when they perceive an institution as illegitimate or unjust with its use of 
authority. Consequently, these negative perceptions weaken the border’s institutional 
legitimacy, decreasing social obedience among the local population, and leading to 
additional state investment and reliance on hardening as a method. Originally aimed 
toward securing the border against external threats, such as terrorism, hardening efforts 
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may escalate and enter into a cyclical pattern—such as that depicted in Figure 5—that 
undermines regional stability. 
 
This figure depicts the escalation of border hardening as a circular gear-like pattern 
(l’engrenage). The escalation follows a perceived erosion of border legitimacy in the 
eyes of the local population. This process undermines the institutional stability of the 
border, decreases willing obedience to border rules, and leads to additional state efforts to 
harden the border. The escalation of border hardening is contextualized by historically 
porous borders, global norms that delineate and demarcate borders, and a foreign “danger 
narrative” that has encouraged border hardening since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the 
United States.  
Figure 5.  Border Hardening and the Logic of Escalation. 
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Starting with the security concerns common to nearly all states, the pattern escalates 
when border hardening overwhelmingly and negatively affects the local population (and 
contrasts with a historically porous border). Meanwhile, the local population continues to 
expect the border to remain open. What follows is “the logic of escalation,”429 a pattern 
of additional state reinforcement of the border, decreased local perceptions of 
institutional legitimacy, heightened unwillingness to obey and observe the rules of the 
border, and increasing dependence of the state on border enforcement methods of 
coercion rather than institutional legitimacy. 
Figure 5 depicts this pattern of border hardening as a cyclical process whereby the 
resulting illegitimacy “weighs down” the stability of the border. The lack of legitimacy 
reduces willing obedience, requires additional forms of border hardening when the local 
population becomes non-compliant, and becomes more acute by increasing local 
antagonism against the border institution. The state loses authority from legitimacy and 
must depend further on illegitimate means of enforcement. Under certain historical 
contexts of previously open borders—compounded by contemporary global norms that 
emphasize the securitization of borders—Uzbekistan’s unilateral border hardening may 
result in an expensive, resource-demanding policy response that actually undermines the 
very border it intends to reinforce. The hardened border contradicts local perceptions of 
what the border should be, based on historical expectations, while foreign pressure and 
monetary incentives drive hardening as a solution to security problems that need fixing—
a scenario compounded by the danger narrative described in Chapter III. 
                                                 




The great task is to discover not what governments prescribe but what they 
ought to prescribe, for no prescription is valid against the conscience of 
mankind. 
—Lord Acton, 19th century British historian and politician430 
The preceding analysis investigated the underlying dynamisms of the Uzbekistan–
Kyrgyzstan border as an institution. Considering the historical and geopolitical context of 
the Ferghana Valley, this thesis contends that coercive forms of border enforcement 
through hardening are linked to regional stability through the component of legitimacy. 
Specifically, within the historical context and the regional circumstances of the Ferghana 
Valley, the unilateral hardening of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border may have 
delegitimized state authority, which necessitated further coercive border hardening 
practices that influenced local perceptions and behavior. Although further research needs 
to be done to evaluate local perceptions in more depth and variety, these critical local 
perceptions are indicative of low institutional legitimacy. The perceptions of suspicion 
and annoyance toward some forms of authority, feelings of unfairness and lack of respect 
for the border rules, and a sense of a systemic lack of transparency and accountability on 
the part of those enforcing the border all combine to ultimately undermine the border. 
Institutional legitimacy of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border is central to the 
stability of the borderlands. Local perceptions of the border are a crucial variable to 
border legitimacy. This thesis contends that coercive border hardening erodes the 
institutional legitimacy of the border under certain circumstances and threatens regional 
stability. Although border hardening presents many ethical questions related to the use of 
force by the state, the primary argument of this thesis is that coercive border hardening—
when perceived as illegitimate—may undermine the actual security-related goal that it is 
meant to address through unintended consequences. 
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Chapter I established several premises for understanding borders in relation to the 
concepts of institutional legitimacy, authority, state security policies, and local 
perceptions. Chapter II provided the basic landscape for understanding borders and their 
dynamics. Chapter III explained border making in the Ferghana Valley, including the 
contemporary “danger narrative” and the historical context for border hardening as well 
as the basic chronology for the hardening of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan border. Chapter 
IV builds on the understanding of borders and the context for border hardening with the 
concepts of institutional legitimacy and observance of the border. Chapter V puts forth 
the theory and framework that are meant to conceptualize the relationship between border 
hardening and legitimacy when analyzed through local perceptions. 
The historical and geopolitical contexts of the Ferghana Valley are important 
qualifiers to the proposed theory and framework. Along with the global norm calling for 
“fixed” borders in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, these 
contexts inform the basic assumptions in this thesis, as outlined in Chapter V. The 
historical context represented a shift from open to closed borders in a relatively swift 
period. The Ferghana Valley borders were traditionally characterized as porous and open; 
despite being demarcated under the Soviet Union in the early twentieth century, these 
lines remained largely administrative in nature. The shift from porous and open borders 
of “friendship” to the hardening of borders occurred over a period of several years in the 
late 1990s, solidifying with Uzbekistan’s 1999–2000 unilateral building of a fence along 
the border with Kyrgyzstan.431 
This thesis hypothesizes that when an institution is perceived as a legitimate 
authority, the population generally complies with institutional rules through willing 
obedience. Such an institution is considered stable. When the state no longer fulfills 
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popular expectations, over time the institutional authority of the state is delegitimized. 
People are less likely to obey or comply with an institution’s rules or demands under 
perceptions of illegitimacy.  
 In the case of a border, such negative perceptions by the borderland people 
erodes the institutional legitimacy of the border and leads to at least discontent among the 
local population, but at worst, active resistance and violent opposition to the border and 
state authority in general. Border institutions depend on a mixture of willing obedience 
and coercion by the state to obtain social compliance. Coercive and illegitimate means of 
border enforcement may have unintended consequences, undermining perceptions of 
legitimacy and leading to a logic of escalation of border hardening measures. This may in 
turn necessitate increasing levels of coercive border enforcement in order to achieve 
social compliance. Perceptions of border legitimacy influence the extent to which 
individuals voluntarily comply with border rules. Methods of border hardening are nearly 
always regarded as illegitimate and coercive when they affect the local population 
adversely.  
Between the intended short-term benefits in security and the long-term effects on 
stability, illegitimate means of border enforcement have unintended consequences. The 
logic of escalation becomes an engrenage or circular gear-like pattern that necessitates 
increasing levels of coercive border enforcement in order to achieve social compliance. 
When coercive border hardening is perceived by large groups of the borderland 
population as illegitimate, then the very border being secured by the state is undermined 
institutionally and politically, and its stability is weakened.  
 
B. SIGNIFICANCE AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
This thesis brought together research from multiple disciplines investigating the 
relationships involving border hardening, institutional legitimacy, social behavior, and 
regional stability. This thesis engaged the concepts of a plurality of disciplines by 
drawing theoretical and practical insights from geopolitics, sociology, and political 
philosophy, as well as history and the behavioral sciences. With its discussion of 
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institutional legitimacy, sociologists may find this thesis useful for its insight into 
resilience and borderlands. Political philosophers and behavioral scientists may 
appreciate how this thesis investigated the concepts of authority, coercion, and legitimacy 
in relation to institutional and regional stability. Historians may find merit in examining a 
border’s historical development as a context for understanding changing local perceptions 
of that border, particularly through the “boundary biographies” advocated by British 
geographer Nick Megoran.432 Human and political geographers may also be interested in 
the strong geographic dimension of this thesis, which uses multiple scales of society and 
politics and which depends on ethnographic fieldwork around a political border. Above 
all, this thesis proposed a research agenda that seeks insight into the long-term 
consequences of border hardening as it pertains to regional security. Additionally, this 
framework presents an opportunity for researchers in these fields (including border 
studies, legitimacy, and security) to collaborate with both state policymakers and the 
practitioners of peace who have their “boots on the ground” where the policy and practice 
of border enforcement are felt most: in the borderlands. This collaboration may also help 
bridge any divide between sound public policy and practical implementation in the 
borderland and thus encourage social peace and prosperity as well as a secure and stable 
environment. 
The theory and framework presented in this thesis are ready for future research or 
ethnographic fieldwork in the Ferghana Valley borderlands. Analysis of local perceptions 
can include evidence based on quantitative as well as qualitative research methods. 
Beyond the collection of narrative evidence of perceptions or attitudes concerning the 
borders, future researchers might use surveys and public opinion polls from the Ferghana 
Valley. The political reality in Uzbekistan is, however, an obstacle to constructive 
ethnographic research in the Ferghana Valley. Uzbekistan’s autocratic regime obstructs 
the collection of honest perceptions and opinions of state-run institutions, such as those 
governing the border. Research about autocratic regimes frequently depends on refugees, 
expatriates, or exiles, which narrows the sample to people that are not necessarily 
representative of the borderland population. Additionally, the majority of perceptions 
                                                 
432 See Megoran, “Rethinking the Study of International Boundaries,” 464. 
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collected by Western scholars stem from field research in Kyrgyzstan, which reports on 
the views of both ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks. This sampling of only part of the 
Ferghana Valley’s population is also a narrow view of social perceptions. While access to 
Uzbekistan’s territory in the Ferghana Valley remains restricted for Western scholars, the 
perceptions of border legitimacy on the part of Uzbek citizens can only be inferred from 
what has been gathered mostly from the perceptions of their neighbors across the border. 
Another aspect of future research could be the measuring of legitimacy through 
perceptions. Metrics for measurement could be found in the multiple definitions and 
conceptions of institutional legitimacy, including whether it is based more broadly on 
normative, subjective, objective, legal, or instrumental foundations of authority. Also, as 
Gerschewski suggests in his article “The Three Pillars of Stability,” measuring legitimacy 
in autocracies is far more difficult than in democracies. Autocratic regimes rarely permit 
polling or public opinion surveys, and individuals could not be expected to truthfully 
answer such surveys anyway under politically autocratic conditions.433 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS 
The simple recommendation to policymakers is to pursue means of border 
security that are not only effective (at least empirically) in the short term but also take 
into account perceptions of legitimacy for the long term. Perceptions of legitimacy apply 
to both the border itself and the overall means of its enforcement.  
While there are many normative and financial arguments against building border 
walls or fences, this thesis cautiously suggests that coercive border hardening may in fact 
be counter productive to security and stability efforts because it undermines legitimacy 
and leads to a logic of escalation. Between the intended short-term benefits in security 
and the long-term effects on stability, illegitimate means of border enforcement have 
unintended consequences. The logic of escalation becomes an engrenage or circular gear-
like pattern that necessitates increasing levels of coercive border enforcement in order to 
achieve social compliance. When coercive border hardening is perceived by large groups 
                                                 
433 Johannes Gerschewski, “The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-Optation 
in Autocratic Regimes,” Democratization 20, no. 1 (2013): 20, doi:10.1080/13510347.2013.738860. 
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of the borderland population as illegitimate, then the very border being secured by the 
state is undermined institutionally and politically, and its stability is weakened. As a 
report published by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) asserts, the “lack of legitimacy is a major contributor to state fragility.”434 
Based on the reasoning presented in this thesis, illegitimacy is a source of instability in 
not only the border institution but also a potential source of challenge to the authority of 
the state. “State legitimacy matters,” assert the authors of the OECD report, “because it 
provides the basis for rule by consent rather than by coercion.”435 This logic is relevant 
for both autocratic and democratic forms of government. 
  
                                                 
434 OECD, The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: Unpacking Complexity (Paris, France: 
OECD Publishing, 2010), 3, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264083882-en. 
435 Ibid., 3.. 
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